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1 INTRODUCTION 
The increased competition, change in government regulation and customers" ability for 
choice have provided the electric industry in the US a more competitive environment. The 
importance of ancillary services and other interconnected .services cannot be overemphasized 
in maintaining system security and reliability in this new climate. 
.Among the several re-regulation models that have evolved so far. a central entity, called the 
independent system operator (ISO), has been created to have various responsibilities including 
identifying the necessary services and allocating the costs of services to the transmission users. 
In the research reported in this dissertation, how the ISO should identify and allocate 
the services of reactive support and real power loss are the major focus. Preliminary service 
identification and allocation for reactive support as a part of this research were reported in [I. 2] 
and [.3]. 
In this section, the motivation and objective of this research is first presented, .\fter that, 
the background that is the basis of this work is described. The problem statement is provided 
in the following section, followed by an overview of the original contributions. The last part of 
this chapter is an executive summary. 
1.1 Research Motivation and Objective 
This research was motivated by the challenges that the electric industry faces in a compet­
itive environment, in identifying and allocating the ancillary services and other interconnected 
services. These services, according to the definitions in the Federal Energy Regulatory Com­
mission's (FERC) Notice of Proposed Rulemaking [4]. are "those necessary to support the 
transmission of electric power from seller to purchaser given the obligations of control areas 
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and transmitting utilities within those control areas to maintain RELIABLE operation of the 
inter-connected transmission system." 
The services listed in FERC's order 888 [5] include; 
• .Ancillary services 
— Scheduling, system control and dispatch service: 
— Reactive supply and voltage control from generation source service': 
— Regulatory and frequency response service: 
— Energy imbalance service: 
— Operating reserve — spinning reserve service: and 
— Operating reserve — supplemental reserve service. 
• Other interconnected services 
— real power loss service 
— dynamic scheduling service 
— backup supply service 
— restoration service 
Lentil a few years ago. these services were bundled together and were provided by the 
vertically integrated utilities, who were nearly the only participants. The changes that have 
occurred include increased competition with additional new players: and modified regulations 
for the U.S. electricity industry. .-Vs the costs related to these services are approximately Sl4 
billion per year in US [6]. it has been realized that unbundling these services is likely to promote 
economic efficiency in terms of increased competition among the service providers and lowered 
cost to customers. The problem of service identification and allocation becomes a key factor 
in the overall structure of deregulation. 
' In this research, this service is Ccdled reactive support ser\'ice for short. 
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However, identifying individual services as a separate commodity is complicated by the 
level of transactions, various market conditions, the technical interdependences and the relia­
bility requirements. Moreover, the non-linearity in the transmission grid as a whole and the 
simultaneity of transactions increase the complexity of service allocation. 
Motivated by these challenges, the objectives of this research are to: 
1. Define an optimization framework for the ISO to identify necessary services while man­
aging transmission congestion: apply this framework into the service identification of 
reactive support and real power losses. 
2. Develop an allocation algorithm for the ISO's use to allocate the cost of the identified 
services fairly and quickly . 
1.2 Research Background — Power system Operation in the Competitive 
Environment 
This research is based on a market-based competitive operational environment. Figure 1.1 
describes the operation model. This model was developed by the author and is believed to 
be flexible enough to represent most situations. The roles of the markets, the databases, and 
the ISO are described in the following sections. .-V similar model is being implemented in the 
California utlitity restructuring. 
1.2.1 Markets, Market Participants and Market Models 
The roles of profit-driven entities are depicted in the top part of Figure LI. These entities 
include the transmission system owners and various market participants. 
The transmission component of power delivery has declining average costs. It presently 
appears that transmission will remain a natural monopoly for the near future. Therefore, the 
transmission owners have few competitors and they profit from the current pricing structure. 
The energy and service markets are the two market places, where the sellers compete for 
4 
Transmission System 
Energy Market Service Markets 
public 
DB4 DB3 DB2 DBI 
Independent System Operator 
Figure 1.1 Power system operation model 
demands and the buyers compete for supplies. ^ In California, these markets are called power 
e.Kchanges and are operated by a group of schedule coordinators. 
In the competitive environment, electric energy and the various related services are traded 
as commoditities. The individual decisions of commoditity production and consumption are 
aggregated and equilibrium prices result. Therefore, the market participants are not limited to 
the vertically integrated utilities, who historically were the main supplier of electricity before 
deregulation. Various players and their roles in the markets are listed in Table 1.1. 
In both the energy market and the service markets, the commodities could be traded either 
through formal organized exchanges with well-defined rules and trading procedures, or through 
less-formal markets called over-the-counter markets. 
Trading through organized exchanges is always via an auction system, of which there are 
a number of variants; but the general result is intense competition in the trading on both the 
^Unless rules are in place, market conditions may, under certain conditions, produce a buyer or a seller 
market. 
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Table 1.1 The roles of market participants 
Participants Energy Markets Service \Iarkets 
I. Gencos 
lOL's seller/buyer seller/buyer 
Fed Gens seller/buyer seller/buyer 
State Gens seller/buyer seller/buyer 
G&:T Co-ops seller/buyer seller/buyer 
Munis seller/buyer seller/buyer 
IPPs seller/buyer seller/buyer 
Cogens seller/buyer seller/buyer 
Other NCGs'^ seller/buyer seller/buyer 
2. Transcos 
lOUs seller 
Fed Trans seller 
State Trans seller 
G&:T Co-ops seller 
Munis seller 
Other .N'UTs seller 
3. Discos 
lOUs buyer seller/buyer 
Dist Co-ops buyer seller/buyer 
.Munis buyer seller/buyer 
4. Customers 
Industrial buyer buyer 
Commercial buver buyer 
Residental buyer buyer 
.Agricultural buyer buyer 
Other buyer buyer 
5. Other Groups 
Power \[arketers seller/buyer seller/buyer 
Load .Aggregators buyer buyer 
Metering Service Co. seller 
a Certain member of the customer group may also function as NUGs 
in both the energy and service markets. 
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buying and selling sides [7]. The aution models that are involved in this research are the double 
auction and the single auction models. 
A double auction model is depicted by Figure 1.2. where both the sellers and the buyers 
submit bids and the broker matches these bids according to the merit order. .A. clearing price 
is determined when there is little, if any, price difference between the seller's and the buyer's 
bid. 
bid bid 
Broker 
price i L 
buyers' bids 
clearing 
price 
sellers' bids 
Buyer m 
Buyer 2 
Buyer I 
Seller n 
Seller I 
Seller 2 
Quantity 
Figure 1.2 Double auction model 
single auction model is shown in Figure 1.3, where only sellers e.\plicitly compete for 
customers. The clearing price will be determined by the last bid price when the forecast 
demand is met. 
The over-the-counter markets are usually the dealer markets, which are described by Fig­
ure 1.4. .A. broker or dealer makes a market by offering to both buy and sell an asset. Sometimes, 
the buyer and the seller contact each other directly and make a deal. This model is also called 
the bilateral contract model. 
allcxrate bid 
Broker 
Buyer m 
Buyer 1 
Buyer 2 
Seller n 
Seller 2 
Seller 1 
pnce i i 
clearing 
price 
I 
sellers' bids 
r 
forecast 
demand 
Quantity 
Figure 1.3 Single auction model 
Broker! Buyer Seller 
Figure 1.4 Over-the-counter (bilateral contract) model 
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DifTerent market models have been adopted by different countries and U.S. states in their 
re-regulation process. In UK. a single auction model is being implemented, where the system 
operator determines the seller's bids and energy price so that the forecasted loads can be 
satisfied. California allows both the double auction and over-the-counter models for their 
energy markets. 
For the service markets, different services are unbundled and are traded seperately. .-V 
market clearing price for each service will be calculated. In addition to the double auction 
and bilateral contract model that could be used, a single auction model is required for ISO to 
select necessary services for system reliability. 
Figure I.l is flexible enough to include each of the market models just described. For 
reasonable analysis in this research, the energy market was assumed to include both the double 
auction and over-the-counter models. For the service markets, the two markets that were 
considered are the reactive support market and real power loss market. They are each assumed 
to be a single auction market. Table 1.2 lists the market models that were used in this research. 
Table 1.2 The market models used in this research 
Double auction Single auction Over-the-counter 
Energy markets v/ 
Reactive support market 
Real power loss market 
1.2.2 Databases 
.\s shown in Figure I.l. several databases were used to store the necessary information 
related to the energy markets, the service markets, the transmission system and the ISO. The 
first database. DBl. is a confidential energy market database, which contains the information 
for proposed and accepted transactions bids. DB2 is a confidential database for the individual 
transmission systems. .Any confidential information, such as the cost of transmission facilities 
and their operations, is stored here. DB3 is a confidential service market database and it 
contains the information for the proposed and accepted service bids. The last database, DB4, 
is a public database for maintaining information such as historical generation and transmission 
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data, transmission maintenance schedules, transmission rates^. available transmission capacity 
(ATC), and etc. It has the same function as the open-access same-time information service 
(O.-VSIS). 
Since this research is modeling only a subset of the ISO's functions, it only requires a portion 
of the information in these databases. The related information flow is listed in Table 1.3. 
1.2.3 The Independent System Operator 
A central coordinator, defined as the independent system operator (ISO), plays an impor­
tant role in guaranteeing transmission open access on a non-discriminatory basis. 
In Reference [5], eleven ISO principles are provided which include: 
1. The ISO has a fair, non-discriminatory governance structure. 
2. The ISO has no financial interests in any power market participants. 
3. There is a single, open-access tarriff for the entire ISO area. 
4. The ISO has responsibility for system security. 
5. The ISO may control system dispatch in its area for effectuating pool or bilateral dis­
patches. 
6. The ISO can identify and resolve transmission constraints. 
7. The ISO has incentives to act efficiently. 
8. The ISO's transmission and ancillary service pricing promotes efficiency. 
9. The ISO must post transmission availability in real time on electronic bulletin boards. 
10. The ISO must coordinate with adjacent control access. 
11. The ISO must have a dispute resolution procedure. 
'Practically, different transmission rate may e.xist within the ISO's control area. 
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Table 1.3 Information flow related to the research 
In-bound 
information flow to ISO 
Out-bound 
information flow from ISO 
DBl 
(confidential) 
proposed transactions 
for each transaction. 
1. Buyer and seller names 
2. Energy amount 
3. Buying and selling price 
4. Buying and selling adjustment bid 
5. Buying and selling locations 
6. Beginning and ending time 
accepted transactions 
for each transaction. 
1. Accepted energy amount 
2. Expected cost of losses 
3. Expected cost of reactive 
support 
DB2 
(confidential) 
1. Cost data for transformer 
2. Cost data for capacitors 
1. Tap positions 
2. Capacitor switching schedule 
DB3 
(confidential) 
proposed 
reactive support service 
for each bid. 
1. Seller names 
2. Price of reactive power 
3. Location of reactive power 
4. Min-max reactive power range 
•5. Beginning and ending time 
proposed 
real power loss service 
for each bid. 
1. Seller names 
2. Price of loss support 
3. Location of loss supporter 
4. Min-Max loss support range 
5. Beginning and ending time 
accepted 
reactive support service 
for each bid. 
1. Voltage setting 
2. Reactive power output 
3. Expected service payment 
accepted 
real power loss service 
for each bid. 
1. Amount of real power output 
2. Expected service payment 
DB4 
(public) 
1. Transmission facility technical data 
2. Generation facility technical data 
3. Loading /voltage limits 
4. .-Vvailability of facilities 
5. Typical power flow data and 
current schedules 
6. Typical market price data and 
transmission rates 
1. Forecasted power flow 
2. Forecasted price of service 
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Membership and departure requirements must also be defined and be public knowledge. 
.According to these principles, different ISOs may develop their own functions based on the 
requirement specified by their regulation rules. 
In this research, the ISO's technical functions are of major concern. Based on the market-
based power system operation model set up by the author, the ISO's technical functions are 
divided into three parts as shown in Figure 1.5. 
Day-ahead schedulin; 
Hour-ahead scheduling 
2. Real-time operation function 
1. Before-the-fact scheduling function 
I 
3. After-the-fact analysis and billing settlement function 
Figure 1.5 ISO functionalities 
• Before-the-fact scheduling 
The scheduling process has been designed to provide reasonable time frames so that the 
ISO can do periodic analysis to ensure reliable transmission system operation, and the 
market participants can make realistic operational decisions. 
This process is divided into two time frames [8]: the day ahead energy schedule, to be 
completed appro.ximately 5-10 hours before the beginning of the operating day. and hour-
ahead energy schedule, which occurs appro.ximately one hour prior to each hour within 
the operating day. 
12 
— Day-ahead scheduling 
The day-ahead schedule is developed after several iterations between market par­
ticipants and the ISO. The ISO uses computer tools to evaluate whether all energy-
schedules can be accommodated simultaneously on the transmission system. These 
schedules come from the successfully matched bids by the brokers and the two par­
ties of bilateral contracts. If the ISO finds potential transmission congestion, it 
informs the scheduling parties how. based on modeling results, the congestion will 
be eliminated. 
-Market participants could modify and resubmit their schedules. It further requires 
the brokers to re-match the modified bids. The ISO will then resolve any remaining 
congestion by the same process until no congestion would occur or the time for 
day-ahead scheduling is over. 
The day-ahead scheduling also includes the scheduling of services. Parties wishing to 
offer services will submit bids. Based on the day-ahead energy schedules submitted, 
the ISO will determine what services it needs to support the resultant scheduled 
transactions. The ISO will also allocate the e.xpected cost of services to each energy 
market participant. This allocated cost information will assist them in making 
operational decisions and adjusting bids. To the service providers, the ISO acts as 
a buyer, and to the transmission users, the ISO acts like a service seller. 
— Hour-ahead scheduling 
The day-ahead accepted schedules become the basis for settlement in the real-time 
market. Parties will however, be able to ask the ISO for schedule adjustments closer 
to real time. The goal is to move the time at which the last schedule adjustments 
can be accepted by the ISO to as close as possible to real time. This will permit 
suppliers to most closely commit to meeting the requirments of their customers. In 
contrast to day-ahead scheduling process, there will be no iteration between the ISO 
and the market participants in response to congestion. 
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• Real time operation 
The ISO is responsible for the second-to-second balancing of system-wide generation and 
load to meet the control area operating criteria. It will use the services that it has 
acquired. If a system emergency occurs, the ISO has the authority to order on or off 
any generator or load and adjust any schedules to maintain or restore reliable, stable 
system conditions. It will also record the actual system operation as it occurs on a 
second-to-second basis. 
• .-Vfter-the-fact analysis and billing settlement 
.\'o matter how well the participants do their forecasting, the actual load, generation, and 
transmission system conditions will differ from what was scheduled. The ISO will use 
the recorded results of real-time operation to determine the final cost to each participant 
that reflects actual usage. 
1.3 Problem Statement 
This research is focused on the challenges that are faced by the ISO in the day-ahead 
scheduling function. Three functional activities are considered including : congestion manage­
ment/transaction adjustment, service identification, and service allocaiton. The relationship 
between the three functions is shown in Figure 1.6. 
In this section, the assumptions that this research is based upon are discussed in Se-
cion 1.3.1. The problem descriptions for the three functions are provided in Sections 1.3.2. 
1.3.1 General Assumptions 
1. .\ssumptions on the market models 
(a) Imperfect competition exists in the energy markets and services markets. 
In a perfectly competitive market, there are no barriers to entry and e.>cit. No 
single participant has the power to influence the prices and the marginal cost of 
production equals to the market price. However, in the actual energy markets and 
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Figure 1.6 Three function modules in day-ahead scheduling 
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service markets that have come in to existence so far and appear to evolve in the 
near future, some barriers to entry and exit exist, as listed in Reference [9]. In 
addition, some participants may be able to influence prices if sufficient competition 
does not exist. 
(b) The energy market was assumed to include the double auction and over-the-counter 
(bilateral contract) models. Service markets were assumed to be based on the single 
auction model. 
.-Ml the three models are allowed in the energy market and the service markets. But 
at least the single auction markets must be in existence for the ISO to guarantee suf­
ficient services for system security. The assumptions for the market models are only 
for the research convenience and will not affect the general results and conclusions. 
(c) The transmission and distribution systems were assumed to be monopolies. Retail 
access was not allowed. 
It is widely accepted that the transmission stage of the power industry has declining 
average costs over the range of outputs observed today [10]. It appears that trans­
mission will remain a natural monopoly for the near future. .Most observers also 
believe that the distribution stage of the industry is a natrual manopoly. although 
agreement is not universal. 
The prerequisite for direct retail access is a well-functioning wholesale market, an 
open-access transmission system, an independent system operator, well-defined an­
cillary services, etc. These prerequisites are still developing. It was assumed that 
no retail access is allowed. The distribution system will take full responsibility to 
serve the customers. However, it is realized that retail markets are being established 
and more will occur in the future. This assumption does not violate the operation 
models, but it does service to simplify the research compliexity. 
2. .\ssumptions on the market participants 
(a) Rational behavior of market participants were assumed. 
16 
The rational behavior of the individual participants is to maximize the individual 
utility. It is assumed that this utility is proportional to the individual economic 
profit. 
(b) Capital cost investment is recovered hourly. 
This research deals with the day-ahead scheduling of the ISO. which is. by its 
definition, a short run behavior. Generally, the decision making in the short run does 
not require the inclusion of fi.xed cost. However, power system devices require large 
investments of capital cost. Traditionally these costs are covered by the customers 
through the prices they pay. In the competitive environment, these costs could be 
transformed into the cost per operating hour per MVV. MV'ar or MV.\. VV'henever 
the devices are in operation, their related capital costs could be partly recovered. 
3. .Assumptions on the ISO's decision making 
(a) There e.xists a known feasible base case and final case. 
The base case is asssumed to be given. It includes previously agreed upon contracts 
that e.xisted before the submission of proposed transactions. The ISO should have 
already identified an optimal amount and sources of services for these contracts to 
maintain system reliability. All the proposed energy transactions and service bids 
are assumed to be in addition to the base case. .-V feasible final case is assumed to 
exist. Otherwise, it is meaningless to attempt the real-time operation. 
(b) Two-party energy transactions were the minimum unit for adjustment and alloca­
tion. 
FERC and most utilities today function in a bilateral world [10]. the bilateral con­
tracts are called transactions. .-Mthough sometimes, one contract may involve sev­
eral buyers and sellers, the multi-party contract can be decomposed into several two 
party transactions, that have the same effect as the orignal multi-party contract. 
However, the bilateral model (over-the-counter model) is not the only market model 
that is allowed in this research. In the double auction model, the matched selling 
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and buying bids can also be regarded as transactions between the sellers and buyers. 
VV'hen transaction adjustment is necessary, the adjustment is considered "intra-
transaction" adjustment, i.e.. the buyer and the seller for one transaction will be 
adjusted by the same amount. 
The ISO will also allocate the cost of services based on transactions. But who will 
pay for them, the buyer, the seller, or both, is not the concern of this research. 
This research serves only to identify how to allocate the cost and service to indi­
vidual transactions: the split within a transaction is a legal, rather than a technical 
question. 
(c) .A. transaction was described by the real power that it is to be transferred. fixed 
power factor was assumed if the buyer is a load. 
(d) A steady state model of electric system is assumed. 
The compelete description of power system involves the solution of algebraic equa­
tions and differential equations. In this research, the dj'namic behavior of power 
system is considered beyond the scope of this research. Only the algebraic equations 
of the power system analysis were used. 
(e) The level of services was assumed to be a continuous scalar function and was not 
affected by the transaction simulation order for simultaneous transactions. 
For the services related to this research, i.e. the services of reactive support and 
real power losses, the service levels are continuous scalar functions with respect 
to transaction amount. Therefore, they will not be affected by the transaction 
simulation order. 
1.3.2 Problem Description 
1.3.2.1 Congestion Management and Service Identification 
More and more transactions are utilizing the transmission system in the market-based oper­
ation environment. However, the capacity of the system is limited by physical constraints and 
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reliability requirement. In day-ahead scheduling, when the ISO finds out that the transmis­
sion system can not accommodate all the proposed transactions without violating reliability 
requirement, an optimal transaction curtailment should be determined through congestion 
management techniques. 
Service identification is to identify the optimal amount and location of services, such as 
reactive support and real power loss services, so that the transmission system can accomodate 
as many transactions as possible. Since it was assumed that an optimal base case exists, the 
services identified were the additional services required by the additional transactions. 
Congestion management and service identification are dependent on each other. The pro­
posed transactions will determine how much of each service is required and the service level may 
aggrevate or alleviate the operating limits. Therefore, both the congestion management and 
the service identification will be affected by the transmission-related factors and market-related 
factors. These factors are listed in Table 1.4. 
Table 1.4 Transmission-related factors and market-related factors 
Factor Congestion management Service identification 
Transmission-related 
System thermal overload Within scope Within scope 
conditions voltage/Var conditions Within scope Within scope 
stability conditions Outside scope Outside scope 
Cost of basic transmisison services Outside scope Outside scope 
.\etwork outage risk Outside scope Outside scope 
Other Outside scope Outside scope 
Market-related 
distribution of prices Within scope Within scope 
Intra- cost and bidding price VV'ithin scope Within scope 
market buyer and seller location Within scope Within scope 
others Outside scope Outside scope 
Inter- multiple market participation W^ithin scope Within scope 
market technical interdependence Within scope Within scope 
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Transmission-related Factors 
System conditions are important factors in congestion management and the resultant ser­
vice identification. Congestion is a consequence of network constraints characterizing a finite 
network capacity that precludes the simultaneous delivery of the total power for an associated 
set of power transactions. The network constraints include thermal limits. voltage/V'.A.R re­
quirements and stability consideration. Since a steady state power system model was assumed 
in this research, only the thermal limit and voltage/V'.A.R requirements were considered. 
The cost of basic transmission services was determined by the transmission owner, since the 
transmission system is assumed to be a monoploy and their owners profits from the regulated 
transmission prices. It should be remembered that, according to FERC's rules, the transmission 
must charge the same price to all users including himself. Certainly, the market participants 
will be affected by the cost of transmission service according to the schedules determined by 
the ISO. However, this is outside the scope of this research. 
.\etwork outage r/s/risan aspect that affects system operation. The ISO should consider the 
probability and the impact of contingencies before making the operating decisions. However, 
how to incorporate this item into congestion management and service identification is outside 
the research scope. 
Market-related factors 
Intra-market factors include the distribution of bidding prices, cost and bidding prices of 
individual market participants, the buyer and seller's locations, and other attributes of the 
transactions. .A.11 these factors should be considered when competing the resources inside each 
service market and the energy market. 
Inter-market factors include multiple market participations and the technical interdepen­
dence between various markets. One participant is able to participate in more than one market, 
as long as his utlitity function or economic profit is ma.ximized. This will certainly affect the in­
dividual's decisions and the resultant ISO's decisions. The technical interdependence refers to 
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the coupling between energy and various services. For example, the acutal transaction amount 
affects the services required, such as the reserve and reactive support: and the appropriate 
level of services may alleviate transmission congestions. 
Considering the transmission-related and market-related factors, an optimization procedure 
is proposed in this research to manage congestions and identify necessary services. Its objective 
is to ma.ximize the overall profit of all market participants. In case of limited information, a 
lower bound profit maximization (cost minimization) becomes a substitute. How to evaluate 
the cost of services and prepare the bids are also presented as a part of this work. 
1.3.2.2 Service Allocation 
Service allocation is to divide the amount and cost of services among the individual trans­
actions. However, the further division within the transaction, if any. between the seller and 
the buyer is not of interest. 
.\s the transactions are added simultaneously on the transmission system, the non-linearity 
of the system increases the difficulty of service allocation. For a successful allocation algorithm 
to work, it must include the following properties: 
• .\llocation quantity: the allocation quantity must fully recover the cost of services. 
• Allocation ratio: the allocation ratio should reflect fairness, i.e. allocation should be 
based on the actual usage of the services by the individual transmission users. 
• Application feasibility: the allocation method should be feasible in practical application, 
i.e. there should be no convergence problems and the method should require only limited 
computational time, capability, and storage. 
It is almost impossible to find an algorithm that could easily satisfy all these properties. 
The average sensitivity method proposed in this work is a positive step toward this goal. 
Details of this method are presented in Chapter 6. 
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1.4 Overview of Original Contibutions 
This section provides an overview of the original contributions made by this research. In 
this dissertation, an attempt has been made to clarify which parts of the work presented are 
the results of the assumptions and lessons drawn from existing literature, and which parts are 
the results of original work: this section clearly states the original contributions. 
1. A possible representation of the structure for the combined energy market, service mar­
kets, the ISO and the market participants was defined. It can be used to analyze the 
behavior of market participants and the ISO. 
2. A. framework of total profit ma,\imization was proposed in this research to identify services 
and manage congestion. Since the rational behavior of profit ma.ximization for each 
participants is assumed, the ISO's decision will inevitably affect the individual's profit. 
By analyzing the cash flow among the market participants and the ISO. a total profit 
ma.ximization was proposed so that the profit for each individual is treated equally in 
terms of dollar values. 
3. The ideal optimization requires the accurate information on the cost of energy and ser­
vices. However, these information is generally not directly available to the ISO. Given 
the available information, the lower bound profit ma.ximization or upper bound cost 
minimization was proposed as a subsititute. 
4. Because of the technical interdependence among the reactive power, transmission losses 
and congestions, identifying separately each service and the adjustment of transactions 
may under or overestimate the amount of services required. The lower bound profit max­
imization was applied in this research to simultaneously identify transaction curtailment, 
reactive support services and real power loss services. 
5. The concept of economic cost has been widely used in economic analysis. It represents 
the true cost so that the economic profit can be evaluated as it affects the behavior 
of producers. In this research, the analytic framework of economic cost analysis was 
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presented. It is composed of the explicit and opportunity costs. Because of the various 
markets in which a producer can be involved, the opportunity cost reflects the intermarket 
related factors. 
6. The opportunity cost for the reactive support service and real power loss service were 
identified and evaluated. The opportunity cost refers to the profit of capacity that is 
unrealizable because of the service production. Strategic bidding technique was applied 
to evaluate this profit. 
7. The average sensitivity method is a significant improvement from the previously used 
power flow-based and sensitivity-based approaches. Theoretical evidence indicates that 
for a second-order service function, this method guarantees full cost recovery. For higher 
order service functions, the allocation quantity mismatch can be reduced and eliminated 
by piecewise approximations. These transaction sensitivities correctly reflect the usage 
of the services. 
8. The average sensitivity method was applied to allocate the services of reactive support 
and real power loss. Practical implementation does not require complicated mathematical 
calculations. Under most operating conditions, the average loss sensitivity and average 
reactive power sensitivity require only limited number of power flows. Since the allocation 
is performed after the optimal service is identified, the allocation amount will not affect 
ISO's decisions. 
1.5 Executive Summary 
In Chapter 2. a review of the relevant literature is presented. Because of the wide scope of 
the services involved, this chapter is not intended to be a comprehensive bibliography on the 
issues that affect congestion management, service identification and allocation. However, an 
attempt has been made to provide a review of representative papers from each relevant area. 
In Chapter .3. a framework of total profit maximization is presented and discussed. It is 
a combined method that simultaneously identifies services and determines transaction curtail­
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ment. 
In Chapter 4. a framework of economic cost analysis is presented. The economic cost 
is composed of the explicit opportunity costs. They are used to evaulate the cost of reactive 
support services and real power loss services. The evaluation method, especially the evaluation 
of opportunity cost is discussed in detail. The bid preparation is also briefly included in this 
chapter. 
In Chapter o. the proposed optimization approach is applied to determine curtailment and 
identify reactive support and real power loss services. Solution algorithms are also discussed. 
In Chapter 6. a service allocation method using the average sensitivity method is pre­
sented. It begins with the theoretical proof of the average sensitivities, followed by a practical 
application that avoids complicated computations. 
In first part of Chapter 7, test results of the economic cost analysis are presented. Results 
on service identification and congestion management are presented ne.Kt. In the last part, the 
service allocation results are compared with other allocation mechanisms. 
In Chapter 8. conclusions and suggestions for future work are presented and discussed. 
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2 REVIEW OF RELEVANT LITERATURE 
2.1 Power Industry Restructuring 
There are many issues associated with the power industry restructuring, especially when 
open access is fully considered. It is not possible to include all the related literature in this 
review. However, an attempt has been made in this section to review the papers that are most 
relevant. For a comprehensive bibliography of work related to these issues, see references [12] 
and [13]. 
2.1.1 Important Rules and Regulation Models 
The power industry restructuring is being driven by the increased competition, changing 
regulation and increased customer choice. From the rules that have already been made, how^ 
US utility re-regulation has evolved thus far clearly can been seen. 
.A.S early as 1978. the passage of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies .Act (PURP.A.) first 
required utilities to purchase electricity at their avoided cost from qualifying facilities. The 
Energy Policy .Act of 1992 further expanded wholesale competition. It opened all utilities to 
the unregulated generation business, and introduced wholesale wheeling between generators 
and distributors. This act laid the groundwork for the FERC "MegaNOPR" rulemaking [4], 
which proposed open access for the transmission under FERC's jurisdiction. In 1996. the 
passage of FERC's Order 888 [5] formally created open access. It required utilities to file 
nondiscriminatory open access tariffs and provided for recovery of stranded costs. State utility 
regulators have also enacted significant reforms — most prominently, California's ongoing 
restructuring and more recent proposals in almost every other state. It is interesting to note 
that three months after all customers in California were given the opportunity to select their 
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electricity provider, less than 0.5% have switched providers. 
Several reform models have been implemented or are under discussion. In [14], these 
models can be classified into (1) franchise bidding. (2) competitive bidding for generation. (3) 
wholesale or retail wheeling, and (4) mandatory or voluntary pooling. The authors of [1-5] 
chose four models that correspond to varying degrees of monopoly, competition and choice in 
the industry. These models are: (l)monopoly at all levels. (2) purchasing agency or pooico. (3) 
wholesale competition, and (4) retail competition. Figure 2.1 shows how these models move 
closer to providing the consumer a choice of suppliers. 
Genco Purchasing 
Agent or 
Wholesaler 
Disco Consumer 
Monopoly 
Pooico 
Wholesale Competition 
Retail Competition 
Figure 2.1 Regulation models 
2.1.2 Energy Markets 
In Reference [16]. electric energy is viewed as a commodity, .\lthough unlike other com­
modities, the energy can not be stored. It still can be traded in commodity markets. These 
markets include cash (spot) markets, futures markets, options markets, swap markets and 
planning markets. Energy brokers match the '"bid" and "'ask" prices in each market. 
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Several methods have been proposed for implementing a brokerage. A linear programming 
based implementation was proposed in [17]. in which the optimal bids were selected by a 
LP-based bid-matching algorithm. Optimal bids can also be determined by the OPF method 
presented in [18]. 
Different market participants may use different strategies in determining their own energy 
bids. Strategic bidding, which is commonly used in other industries, has been introduced in 
the power area. In [19], a suboptimal bidding strategy was proposed, which resulted in the 
ma.\imization of the expected lower bound profit on the savings achieved by a buyer or a seller. 
.A novel approach by using genetic algorithms was presented in [20]. 
2.1.3 Independent System Operator 
The creation of an "independent system operator" (ISO) is an idea that has gained almost 
universal acceptance in the restructuring debate. But the functions of the ISO vary from 
location to location. This can be reflected by the proposed names for the grid operator, which 
include the ISO. the independent grid operator (IGO). the independent tariff administrator 
(IT.\). the independent contract administrator (IC.A.) and others [10]. The ISO could also 
be a regional transmission group (RTG) with the authority and responsibility of operating a 
reliable transmission grid [16]. In Order 888. FERC did not require, but did encourage, the 
establishment of an ISO-type organization in each interconnected area. 
The California's ISO is separated by several hundred miles from the power e.xchange. which 
is an organization where the energy bids are matched. The responsibilities of the ISO include 
ensuring that the schedules for use of the transmission system are feasible, operating the 
transmission system in real time, and settling financially with various parties who own and/or 
use the transmission systems [8]. 
2.1.4 Ancillary Services and the Service Msirkets 
.\ncillary services are those things necessary to support the delivery of electric power from 
seller to purchaser given the obligations of control areas and transmitting utilities within those 
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control areas to maintain RELIABLE operation of the inter-connected transmission system [4]. 
The unbundling of ancillary services from the basic transmission service is thought to 
promote greater economic efficiency in the electric industry. However, what kind of services 
are considered as an ancillary service and are able to be unbundled has been in controversy for 
some time. FERC proposed the following si.x ancillary services in its MegaNOPR: scheduling 
and dispatching service, reactive power/voltage control service, load following service, energy 
imbalance service, loss compensation service, and system protection service. It also asked for 
comments regarding them. The feedback varied. Different people, utilities and organizations 
may define their own set of ancillary services. To complicate matter further, different terms 
have been used to described the same services. In [21]. three generation-related services and 
seven transmission-related services were proposed. They overlapped with the XOPR's services. 
In [6], five revised sets were discussed, .\lthough their services were close to FERC's suggestion, 
different terms were used. The final rule of Order 888 divided the services into six ancillary 
services and several other interconnected services as listed in Section I.I. However, different 
utilities are allowed to use their own subset of services according to their re-regulation models. 
For example, in California, six services are defined which are spinning reserve, non-spinning 
reserve, replacement reserve. regulation/.\GC. voltage support and black-start capability [8]. 
Some of the services can be obtained from the competitive service market, where the services 
are regarded as commodities and are traded separately. The existence of markets for .-VGC. 
spinning reserve, non-spinning reserve and operating reserve services were assumed in [22]. 
For the services defined in [6], the authors claimed that the services of scheduling/dispatch 
and transmission voltage control can not be obtained competitively. Whether the market for 
generation voltage control is competitive depends on the specifics of each situation. In [2:}]. the 
authors pointed out that the competitive markets for spinning reserve, non-spinning reserves. 
AGC. replacement reserve, voltage support and black start already have been setup and are 
now in operation in California. However, the last two services, i.e.. black start capability and 
V.-VR support, are more suitable for purchasing, based on long-term contracts from among 
those units physically capable of providing such services. 
28 
2.2 Congestion Management 
In this section, the papers relevant to congestion management and transaction adjustment 
are reviewed. Congestion is a consequence of various network constraints characterizing a 
finite network capacity that may limit the simultaneous delivery of power from an associated 
set of power transactions [24]. The network constraints include thermal limits. voltage/V'.\R 
requirements and the stability considerations. .Among all the constraints, thermal limits are 
the most frequently considered factor in determining network capacity. 
2.2.1 Traditional Congestion Management 
Traditionally, the power transfer distribution factor(PTDF) method [25. 26] was used to 
manage the congestion. The PTDF refers to the sensitivity of line flow with respect to each 
transaction. .A. linear programming procedure was set up to ma.Kimize the total transfered 
power while ensuring that the thermal limits were not violated. The first contingency rule 
was also included in the constraints. Because of the uncertainties related to contingencies, a 
probabilistic approach was proposed in [27]. The authors applied the Wind Chime Diagram in 
the contingency selection, and determined a probabilistic simultaneous transfer capability using 
a linearized optimization procedure, whose objective function minimized the energy reduction. 
2.2.2 Congestion Management in the New Climate 
Congestion management in the competitive markets is discussed in [24. 28. 29]. In Refer­
ence [24]. congestion management in a pool and a bilateral model was proposed. In the pool 
model, the optimal dispatch problem minimized the total net cost/benefit of individual buses. 
The cost of congestion was bundled with the nodal cost at each bus. In the bilateral model, the 
objective was to minimize the cost of congestion given the incremental and decremental bids 
submitted by generators. The bids represent a generator's willingness to pay to increase or 
decrease its output. The authors concluded that the nodal pricing seeks to provide the correct 
locational price signals, while in bilateral model, the central dispatch process is limited to the 
steps necessary for removing congestion. 
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A study of congestion management based on congestion pricing as might be done by an 
ISO was provided in [28]. It was based on quadratic cost coefficient estimates around a market 
solution and assumed that operators responsible for congestion management can use price 
signals of the generators to manage congestion. The marginal cost was inferred from an 
observation of the market prices. The solutions obtained under the rational economic behavior 
assumption are identical to the solution of an OPF. The authors concluded that the use of 
prices for congestion relief is separable from its use for the generation of transmission revenue. 
The authors of [29] posed two questions regarding congestion management: (1) how will 
each transaction be modified in a non-discriminatory manner, and (2) who will modify the 
transactions? They proposed a minimum-distance redispatch method which disregards the 
economic value of the transaction adjustment. The rescheduled set of transactions is the closest 
point within the secure region. They further suggested that, under a competitive environment, 
a centralized operator could simply suggest a transaction adjustment for the market to use as 
a guide for a further round of negotiations. 
2.3 Service Identification 
In this section, papers related to the various aspects of service identification are reviewed. 
Section 2.3.1 covers the identification of load-following services and reserve services in a com­
petitive environment. In Sections 2..3.2 and 2.3.3. papers related to the identification of reactive 
support service and real power loss services are discussed. Section 2.3.4 discusses some pre­
viously published cost evaluation methods for reactive power allocation and distribution of 
transmission losses. 
2.3.1 Identification of Services in a Competitive Environment 
In [22], the author proposed a method to select .A^GC, spinning reserve, non-spinning reserve 
and operating reserve services from various competitive service markets. mi.xed-integer linear 
programming optimization method was used. The objective function minimized the cost of 
scheduling during the simulation time period. In the model that was adopted by the author. 
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the system operator also acts as an energy broker, so that the sellers bids will be selected by 
the same procedure as the services are identified. 
A similar approach was also presented in [30]. in which the spinning reserve and ready 
reserve requirement were identified by a linear programming method. Different from Refer­
ence [22]. the objective function in [30] maximized the consumer's surplus in the energy and 
spinning reserve markets as well as minimized the cost of required system ready reserve. This 
was accomplished by including the price information of energy bids and reserve margin bids 
in the objective function. The energy bids of both the sellers and the buyers were selected 
together with the ancillary services. 
In [23], ancillary services are procured by the ISO through a cost minimization procedure. 
However, different from the approaches in References [22. 30]. the services are identified one by 
one. The sequence of auction is .A.GC. followed by spinning reserves, non-spinning reserves, and 
replacement reserves. This sequence allows capacity bids that are not selected in one auction 
to be considered in subsequent auctions. 
2.3.2 Reactive Support Service Identification 
.Although there are few papers that address the reactive support service identification in 
a competitive environment, some of the traditional methods for solving the optimal reactive 
power dispatch problem can still be used. 
Optimal reactive power dispatch can be used to determine the location and amount of 
reactive support for the system reliability. Several objective functions have been adopted 
for this optimization problem. .Most authors have selected transmission loss minimization 
as the objective function [31. 32]. It determines the optimal generator voltage levels, the 
optimal switching of capacitor banks, and the optimal tap position for transformers, so that 
the minimum system losses can be achieved. 
In [33], the authors applied minimum control action as the objective function. This min­
imum control action refers to the minimum necessary control for compensators and taps in 
order to reduce the associated depreciation cost. 
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In [34]. the authors listed other objective functions such as maximization of reactive reserve 
margin, maximization of load voltages, etc. What kinds of objective functions to select depends 
on the different requirements of the users. The authors of [35] presented a general objective 
function to minimize the cost of reactive power, but how this cost is defined is not clearly 
stated. 
Many optimization algorithms have been used to solve the reactive power dispatch prob­
lem. since it is a particular type of the optimal power flow. Linear programming was the 
most commonly mentioned method among the related literature as shown in References [32] 
and [36]. Other methods include .Newton's method [37]. the primal/dual method [38], evolu­
tionary programming [39]. and others. 
2.3.3 Real Power Loss Service Identification 
Identification of real power loss service includes the location and amount identification of 
generators that could provide extra energy for the transmission losses. 
Traditionally, a swing bus is defined/identified to balance the mismatch between the gen­
eration and the load. This mismatch corresponds to the transmission losses because of the 
transmission line resistance. Usually, the largest generator in the system is selected as the 
swing bus. However, a single swing bus may concentrate the cumulative injection error and 
may cause an increase of transmission losses if the selected bus is far from the load center. 
Distributed swing buses were suggested in [40] as a method to solve this problem. The largest 
generator in each area is often chosen as the area swing bus. 
Economic dispatch [11]. the simplest form of OPF. was first used to determine each gen­
erators output including the output for the loss support. The penalty factors, which were 
functions of loss sensitivities, were applied in the economic dispatch, so that the total real 
power production cost could be minimized. A broader sense of optimal power flow has also 
been applied into the determination of generators' output. Since power flow equations are 
included in the constraints, swing bus does not need to be specified. 
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2.3.4 Cost of Services 
Both cost and price are important factors in the competitive market. They will affect the 
ISO's decision in identifying services and managing congestion. In this section, papers related 
to the cost of services are reviewed. 
••Vlthough the authors of Reference [41] proposed nine types of transmission costs according 
to their corresponding economic meaning, some authors, see References [42] and [43]. believed 
there are two main categories of transmission service cost: (I) embedded costs and (2) incre­
mental (marginal) costs. Embedded costs are the costs associated with the original investment 
and the ongoing maintenances costs of existing transmission facilities. Incremental costs can 
be further decomposed [44] into operating costs, opportunity costs and reinforcement costs. 
Operating costs are the production costs because of generation redispatch and rescheduling re­
sulting from the transactions. Opportunity costs correspond to the benefits unrealized because 
of the operating constraints that are imposed by the transactions. Reinforcement costs are the 
capital cost of all new transmission facilities needed to accommodate future transactions. 
Related to transmission cost calculations, a summary of twelve generic classes of meth­
ods were presented in [41]. These methods include: (1) cost accounting and related anal­
ysis methods. (2) simple incremental and average cost methods. (3) contract path method. 
(4) megawatt-mile methods (5) rated system path method. (6) transmission cost actual path 
method. (8) general agreement on parallel path (G.APP) method. (9) allocated contract path 
method. (10) investment cost-related method. (II) nodal LRMC with expansion method, and 
(12) nodal SRMC method. Some representatives of the methods are discussed next. 
Happ in [43] examined four embedded cost calculation methods: (1) postage stamp. (2) 
contract path. (3) boundary flow, and (4) megawatt-mile. The megawatt-mile method, which 
was first proposed by [45]. turns out to be the most popular one because it considers ac­
tual flows and the transaction distances. Within incremental cost calculations, the short run 
marginal cost (SRMC) [43. 46, 47], which accounts for the additional operating costs in pro­
viding transmission services, has become the most popular method because of its economic 
basis. References [43, 48] discuss long run marginal costs (LRMC) in which additional rein-
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forcetnent costs were considered. The concept of marginal cost was applied in spot pricing [49] 
of transmission services. 
In [23], the opportunity costs of reserve and other capacity related services were proposed, 
which evaluate the cost of reserved capacity for inframarginal units (the units with marginal 
cost lower than market clearing price). 
.•\s far as the cost and price of reactive power is concerned. FERC's NOPR [4] suggested a 
fi.xed tariff for reactive power support. .Another method, as proposed by [50. 51. 52. 5.3]. was to 
use the node marginal cost. This marginal cost is the sensitivity of the generation production 
cost to the reactive power demand and is usually computed using an optimal power flow 
program. The authors of reference [-54] claimed that the variable costs of producing reactive 
power are often negligible and consequently the charge for reactive power should be determined 
by the existence and availability of reactive power capacity. They further suggested several 
approaches to calculate the capacity value for reactive power. One approach is the usage of 
the triangular relation between the active, reactive and apparent power. Another approach is 
to use the costs of synchronous condensers as the valuation proxy. Cooperative game theory 
has also been suggested by the authors. In reference [35]. a linear or quadratic reactive power 
total cost curve was assumed to be the cost of reactive power. But the authors didn't explain 
how they obtained this curve. 
The transmission loss in this research refers only to the real power loss in MW form. The 
cost of this loss corresponds to the generators* cost in producing real power. This cost has 
already been e.xtensively investigated. The text books in the area of power system operation, 
such as [11], have relevant information on the cost of real power production. 
2.4 Service Allocation 
The allocation algorithms that have been developed so far can be categorized into power 
flow-based, sensitivity-based methods and direct decomposition methods. In this section, these 
three methods are reviewed in Section 2.4.1, 2.4.2, and 2.4.3. Other allocation algorithms will 
be discussed in Section 2.4.4. 
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2.4.1 Power Flow-Based Methods 
Power flow-based methods determine the allocation quantity by comparing power flow-
results with and without an individual transaction. In Reference [55], this method was used 
to allocate the losses. The author suggested to e\'aluate the loss that would occur for each 
transaction by assuming it were the first to be added on the system. similar method was 
suggested in [56] for reactive power allocation. Slightly difl"erent from the above approach, 
the author in [57] suggested to calculate the incremental loss of each transaction as if the 
transaction were the last one added to the system. 
.A.S pointed out by the authors of [58]. the full cost recovery can not be guaranteed by any 
of these approaches. The difference (mismatch) between the summation of individual transac­
tion's effect and all transactions' composite effect may become significant under certain system 
conditions. The authors further suggested a revised algorithm, called aggregated allocation 
method, for service allocations that can eliminate the mismatch. 
This aggregated allocation approach requires two power flow calculations for each transac­
tion so that the "marginal componenf and the "incremental component" could be obtained. 
The "marginal component"' refers to the transaction s contribution as if the transaction were 
the first one added on the system. The "incremental component" is obtained as if the trans­
action were the last one added on the system. The average of the two is identified as the 
transaction's true contribution. This method actually combined the ideas used in [55] and [57]. 
Test results in [58] indicated that it is very accurate in allocating both the transmission losses 
and reactive power. 
-A-nother approach, see Reference [59], fully eliminates the mismatch by performing a se­
ries of power flows from the base case (without any transactions) to the final case (with all 
transactions) with each transaction added one at a time. In order to avoid the effect of trans­
action simulation order, an average power flow method was used by permutating all possible 
simulation orders. 
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2.4.2 Sensitivity-Based Methods 
SensitivMty-based methods provide quick answers to service allocation. The sensitivities 
represent the incremental change in services with respect to the incremental change in trans­
actions. 
In Reference [55]. the loss sensitivities for the base case were derived and evaluated. The 
multiplication of the sensitivity factor and the transaction amount determined the losses allo­
cated to each transaction. 
similar approach was applied by the Mid-Continent .Area Power Pool for loss compen­
sation [60]. .\ loss percentage was defined. Its calculation required several power flow loss 
evaluations with and without a 50MVV power block being transferred between the companies 
within the M.\PP control area. This loss percentage actually has the same meaning as the loss 
sensitivity defined in [55]. But different approaches were used in the two papers to obtain the 
sensitivities. 
Other sensitivity-based approaches, such as the ones proposed in [63. 64]. involve the spot 
prices of the services. .A.n optimal flow was set up to determine the spot price. This price can 
also be decomposed into the prices of individual services. The cost of service allocated to each 
transaction corresponds to the price difference between the buyer's point and the seller's point. 
2.4.3 Direct Decomposition Methods 
In this section, the allocation methods that are based on the direct decomposition of power 
flow are reviewed. .A. megawatt-mile method was proposed in [63. 64. 65] to allocate fi.K cost 
of basic transmission services. The allocation is based on the transaction's flow amount, flow-
direction. flow miles, reliability considerations, or the combinations of these factors. How to 
decompose the line flow is crucial to this method. 
.•\ popular approach is to apply the generalized distribution factors [66] to determine the 
transaction-related power flows. This approach was based on the D.C. linearized model of 
the system and. by using the superposition theorem, determined the impact of a particular 
load or generator on line flows. Reference [67] proposed a novel, topological approach to MVV-
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charging which determined the share, as opposed to the impact, of a particular generator or a 
load in every line flow. This topological approach was based on a recently proposed electricity 
tracing method [68] and resulted in positive generation and load distribution factors. .A. similar 
approach was proposed in [69] to allocate the transmission usage on the basis of traceable 
contributions of generators and loads to maximum line flows. 
References [70. 71] presented a current decomposition method. In this approach, the op­
erating point was determined using all scheduled transactions. It decomposed the comple.x 
current injection at each bus into the currents of individual transactions. Therefore, the com-
ple.x power was decomposed into a major component and an interaction component. The 
major component corresponds to the individual transaction's contribution and the interaction 
component relates to the interaction between the transactions. The authors claims that, under 
normal operating conditions, the interaction component is a small percentage of the transac­
tion itself. The same idea was used when the power flow formulation uses distributed slack 
buses. This method was suggested as a means to calculate the contributions of each ancillary 
service generation unit to each transaction. 
2.4.4 Other Methods 
A Fixed tariff was suggested by FERC's .\OPR [4]. The tariff ranges from 39c for loss 
compensation to I.O mill per kwh for reactive power, load following and reserves. Thus, the 
allocation would be based on the transaction's actual usage times the unit price of the services. 
Game theory recently emerged in power system applications. It was proposed in [72. 73. 
74. 75] to allocate the cost-related to services. It was used to simulate the decision making 
process for defining the offered price in the deregulated environment. The transmission users 
are considered as the participants of a game. Their purposes are to ma.\imize their profits. 
The strategies in playing the game, such as cooperative or non-cooperative, affect the cost of 
the services. 
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3 SERVICE IDENTIFICATION AND CONGESTION MANAGEMENT 
In this chapter, a combined method that identifies services and determines transaction 
curtailment is proposed and developed. The proposed approach intends to ma.ximize the 
overall profit of all market participants. 
The limitations of previous methods are discussed in Section 3.1. .-Vfter that, the cash flow 
among market participants is described in Section 3.2. This leads to a general optimization 
procedure, which is defined in Section 3.3 and 3.4 to solve the congestion management and 
service identification problems. The detailed analysis related to reactive support and real 
power loss services is provided in Chapter -5. 
3.1 Limitation of Previous Methods 
3.1.1 Limitation of Previous Congestion Management Methods 
The limitations of previous congestion management methods include: (1) the selection of 
the power system model and (2) the formation of the objective function. 
Previously, a DC model was used to management congestion. Traditional approaches, as 
discussed in [2-5, 26], used the DC power transfer distribution factor (PTDF) to evaluate how 
the change of transactions would affect the line flows. In Reference [24], an H matrix was 
applied in managing congestion under both the pool model and the bilateral model. H is a 
matrix of bus-branch distribution factors that maps changes in nodal injections to changes in 
flows. This matrix was derived by assuming a linearized representation of the system, which 
is commonly referred to as the "DC power flow". 
The DC model used in deriving distribution factors has the advantage of easy calculation. 
However, when the reactive power is ignored, the line flows may be significantly in error. 
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Using the DC model for managing congestion may underestimate the transmission capability 
and therefore lead to an unnecessary amount of curtailment. 
Another problem with the previous congestion management methods is the objective func­
tion. .VIost of the approaches minimize the total energy curtailment, as suggested by [25. 26. 27] 
and [29]. Other methods require the minimization of net cost [24, 28] or the minimization of 
adjustment cost [24]. 
In the competitive market environment, purely minimizing the total energy curtailment 
fails to provide correct price signals to the market participants. The minimization of cost is a 
feasible objective function. However, how this cost is determined and whether this information 
is available to system operators is still not totally clear. Moreover, in some literature [24]. the 
minimized congestion cost is suggested to be paid by the transmission users to the transmission 
owners. This may mislead the owners to lower transmission limits, so that they can earn more 
because of the congestion. 
3.1.2 Limitation of Previous Service Identification Methods 
Previously, the service identification methods in the competitive markets included a series 
of cost minimization procedures [23] which identified the services of .A.GC, spinning reserve, 
non-spinning reserve and replacement reserve one by one. However, these services are the 
joint products of generators. How and why this identification sequence is defined is not clear. 
.Another two methods [22. 30] identify these services simultaneously through the overall cost 
minimization or consumer surplus ma,ximization. 
However, there is not much literature regarding the competitive procurement of reactive 
services and transmission loss services. 
Traditionally, the objective functions of reactive power dispatch were mainly loss minimiza­
tion [32, 36], control action minimization [33] and etc. Those functions are more or less focused 
on the technical side of reactive support and often lack economic meaning. .A. general objective 
function was presented recently [35] that minimizes the cost of reactive power, but how this 
cost is composed of is not easily interpreted. 
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The selection of a swing bus is crucial in both the congestion management and reactive 
support identification, since a different swing bus will affect the power flow results and the 
resultant sensitivities. In most of the approaches discussed in Sections 2.2 and 2.3. a single 
swing bus was assumed. However, whether this swing bus is optimal in the sense that it 
satisfies the objective function purpose or whether a distributed swing bus is required has not 
been analyzed. 
3.1.3 Separating Congestion Management and Service Identification 
Separating congestion management and service identification ignores the technical interde­
pendence between these two functions. In Reference [28]. the authors indicated that congestion 
can be relieved by the operation of transformer taps and other forms of service. However, the 
general recognition that optimization of reactive power costs can be decoupled from real power 
without significant consequences [24] results from the ignorance of this technical interdepen­
dence. 
Considering the above limitation, a general optimization procedure was developed in this 
research which maximizes the overall lower bound profit while simultaneously determining the 
necessary transaction adjustment and identifying the appropriate service levels. 
3.2 Cash Flow among the Market Participants and the ISO 
Before discussing how the ISO should manage congestion and identify the necessary ser­
vices. this work will first present how money flows between the market participants and the 
ISO. This cash flow is based on the market assumption that the energy market uses the double-
auction and bilateral models, while the service markets use the single-auction models. Since 
this research involves a day-ahead scheduling function. Figure 3.1 represents the money that 
is e.xpected to be e.xchanged for the scheduled energy and services. 
There are nine main cash flows in between the energy buyers, energy sellers, the ISO and 
the service providers. They are shown in Figure 3.1 and are described in the following part. 
1. Revenue of energy buyer t: {t = 1, • • •, nf) 
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Figure 3.1 Cash flow among market participants and the ISO 
41 
!n this research, the distribution system is assumed to be a monopoly. Customers must 
buy energy from their local distribution companies, who. in the energy market, act as 
the wholesale buyers. The revenue received by buyer t is denoted by . which is 
expressed by Equation 3.1. 
^ebuyer ^ j,^ebuycr ^ pp _ ^ ehuyer ^ ^^ 
The first term represents the e.xpected total revenue if there is no congestion, where 
jy^Khuyer retail price for buyer t and is the proposed amount of energy that 
buyer t is going to resell. The actual scheduled amount is denoted by Pj which equals to 
— APi. Since distribution is a monopoly. will be a function of Pf. 
The second term corresponds to the loss of revenue if proposed energy is curtailed by 
APj. is the per unit revenue, or in other words, cost of adjustment. In general, 
is no less than 
2. Revenue of energy seller t: {t = I. - • •. nt) 
The revenue of energy seller t, .  comes from the energy that is scheduled to be 
sold to the energy buyer t in the energy market. It is e.xpressed as: 
^ -pj.eselUr ^ (3 2) 
where corresponds to the unit price (wholesale price) of energy in the market 
or the energy price agreed between the buyer and the seller. This 7^®®'^"®'' is paid by the 
energy buyer t. 
3. Cost of service for energy buyer t: (t = 1. • • - . nt) 
.\ncillary services and other interconnected services are needed for the system security 
and reliability. Since there are costs related to these services, these costs should be shared 
by all transmission users. The cost that the energy buyer t should pay is e.xpressed by 
Equation 3.3. 
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^ ^  ^ gy^bnyer .jj 
k 
where p^^P'"'""'^"' corresponds to the per unit price of the service that is supplied by 
producer k. is the amount of service provided by producer k to buyer t. 
4. Cost of energy production for seller t: Get {t = I. - • - .nt) 
There are many costs related to energy production. For proposed energy amount, these 
costs include the capital investment, the maintenance and labor cost, the fuel cost, and 
the opportunity cost. Moreover, when congestion occurs, there exists a curtailment cost. 
Generally, for each individual energy seller, these cost are functions of the individual 
production level as expressed in Equation 3.4. 
Ce, = CedPt) * AP, (3.4) 
-5. Cost of service for energy seller t: (f = 1. • • - . nt)) 
.\s the energy sellers are also transmission users, they should pay for their costs of service. 
Let represent the amount of service provided by producer k to seller t. then the 
cost of service for energy seller is 
^ ^  jy^sprov,d^r ^ gyeseller (3 - j 
k 
6. Cost of service for the energy transaction t: C.s'''"""' (/ = I. - • - .nt) 
The decision of which parties in a transaction should be responsible for the service cost 
is not of the interest in this research, as long as the total cost will be paid. Generally 
the service cost is denoted in terms of transaction, which is expressed by Equation 3.6. 
Cs ' trans ^  Qg'buyer Q^e^elUr (3 gj  
7. Cost of service paid by service provider k: — i... .^ ns) 
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Service producers are also transmission users. They should pay for their part of the 
service costs. For example, a loss provider should pay the cost of reactive support and 
reactive power producers should pay the cost of reserves. .Although in most cases, this 
cost is comparatively small, it is still one part of the cash flow. 
Equation 3.7 provides an expression for this cost, corresponds to the amount 
of service that is provided by service producer m to producer k. -pr^rovtder 
unit price of the service m. 
Q ^ sproL'ider ^sprovider ^ ^ysprovider 
m 
8. Revenue of service provider k: = 1, - • - , ns) 
The total revenue of service producer comes from the selling of services to the energy-
market participants and the other service producers. 
^sprovtder ^ sprovider r'l-72/ = V r f T  * S \ f c  
r 
_ ^  ^sprovider ^ ^i^yesetler _|_ ^yebuyer ^ .p ^ sprovider ^ ^^y-spr^ovider ^  
(3.8) 
9. Cost of service production for service provider k: Cs^ {k = 1. • • •. ns) 
These are the costs related to the service production. These costs are composed of 
explicit costs and opportunity costs, and they are functions of the service levels as shown 
in Equation 3.9. 
CH- = CskiSVk) (3.9) 
Table 3.1 summarizes the above cash flows. 
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Table 3.1 Cash flow between market participants and the ISO 
Description Paid by Paid to 
(1) r i_ ^ebuyer revenue or energy buyers energy consumers energy buyers 
(2) revenue of energy buyers energy buyers energy sellers 
(3) cost of service 
for energy buyers 
energy buyers the ISO 
(4) cost of energy production Cet energy sellers other related entities 
(o) cost of service 
for energy sellers 
energy sellers the ISO 
(6) cost of service 
for energy transactions 
energy transactions the ISO 
(7) cost of service 
• 1 i_ . • J sprovider paid by service providers LSff 
service providers service providers 
(8) revenue of service providers the ISO service providers 
(9) cost of service production Csk service providers other related entities 
3.3 General Objective Function: Profit Maximization 
3.3.1 Individual Profit of Market Participants 
The cash flows described in previous section have significant impacts on the behavior of 
market participants who participate in the market mainly for their profit maximization. The 
profit of the market participants can be evaluated according to Figure 3.1 and Equations 3.1 
to 3.9. 
The profit of the energy buyer t is his revenue minus his total cost of energy bought from 
the energy market plus his cost for various services. 
_ebuyer _ ^ebuyer _ Reseller _ 
= * PP - * APt - *Pt- Zk 
(3.10) 
The profit of the energy seller t is his income in the energy market minus his total cost of 
energy production plus his cost for various services. 
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^e«//er ^ _ Cci -  Cs'""'"' 
(3.11) 
=  * P t -  C e t i P f )  -  *  AP, - p 
The profit of the service provider k is his income in the service mariiets minus his cost of 
service production plus his cost for other services. 
^sprovider .j^sprovtder Q^sprovider 
~ (3.12) 
= • SVk - CskiSVk) - T,m 
The ISO is a not-for profit entity. The overall flow-in money of the ISO must equal the 
overall out flow of money.' The equality in Equation 3.13 must hold. 
^ H- X! H * ^ y^rov.der ^  ^  ^sprov.der ^ 
t  k  m k 
3.3.2 Overall Profit Maximization 
From the Equations 3.10 through 3.12. the profit of market participants is directly related 
to the levels of energy scheduled (P/ = Pf — APf) and the service levels scheduled (SV't). 
Although the proposed transactions and service bids are provided by the individual market 
participants, the final accepted transactions and the required services are determined by the 
ISO through the congestion management and service identification. 
Since the ISO's decision will affect the participants profit, it can not simply ma.\:imize a 
particular user or a particular group of users" profit. In order to guarantee a non-discriminatory 
open access, the overall profit of all market participants should be considered. This overall 
profit is defined in Equation 3.14. 
nf nt ns 
;r= H (3.14) 
t^ebuyer t^eaelter k^sprovider 
'Sometimes, a small amount of operating fee should be subtracted. 
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Substituting Equations 3.10. 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13 into Equation 3.14. the overall profit 
becomes: 
TT = (l)-(4)-{9) 
=  Y I T *  P t  ( r e v e n u e  o f  e n e r g y  b u y e r s )  
(3.15) 
- Cet{Pt) -Ya ' (cost of energy production) 
— ^^k{SVk) (cost of service production) 
The above e.xpression of overall profit can also be seen from Figure 3.1. where, the net 
money is the profit summation of all market participants. 
Therefore, in order to guarantee non-discriminatory open access, the ideal objective func­
tion for congestion management and service identification would be to ma.ximize the overall 
profit, i.e.. 
Maximize 7Z = Tf • Pf - TJ}' CetiP^) 
(3.16) 
AP,. SV, - ZfK'Jir + - 11" Cs,iSV,) 
where, each participant in the energy and service markets are treated equally in terms of the 
expected profit. 
3.3.3 Maximizing the Lower Bound Profit 
From the previous analysis, the overall profit tt depends on the retail price the 
cost of energy production Ccj. the cost of service production Csi;, and the cost of adjustment 
^adjT'^ and However, this price/cost information is not generally available to the ISO 
unless the markets are fully competitive, and the marginal costs equal to the market prices. 
In the energy and service markets that have come in to existence to date, and are planned 
for in the near future, some barriers to entry and exit e.xist. They are imperfect competitive 
markets and it is impossible for the ISO to have access to the complete cost information. 
.Although the information needed for congestion management and service identification is 
not explicitly available to the ISO, it is reflected by the bid price stored in the DBl and DB3, 
as shown in Figure 1.1. 
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In the energy market, the buy bid prt, t for an energy buyer t represents his willingness to 
pay for a unit of energy. This bid generally reflects the retail price that is at least 
acceptable by the consumers. Since rational behavior of the energy buyer and seller is assumed, 
the per unit buy bid must be no greater than the per unit retail price, i.e. 
(3.17) 
In the energy market, the sell bid for an energy seller t represents his willingness to 
sell for a unit of energy. Under the rational behavior assumption, this bid should at least be 
able to cover the cost of energy production, i.e. 
pr..t > Cet/P[ (3.18) 
In the energy market, the adjustment bid for a buyer pr^^ represents his "willingness" to 
be adjusted. This cost must be at least greater than the true cost (Equation .3.I9). 
since a higher cost indicates a possible lower amount of curtailment. For a similar reason, same 
relationship holds for the seller (Equation 3.20). 
p<.. >dr (•'•19) 
prl, > (S M) 
In the service market, the sell bid Pst-./; for ^ service provider k represents his willingness 
to sell a unit of service, at this price. L nder the rational behavior assumption, this bid should 
at least be able to cover the cost of service production, i.e. 
prsv.ic >Csk/SVk (3.21) 
Substitute inequalities 3.17 to 3.21 into Equation 3.15, the overall profit is rewritten as: 
nt nt  nt  ns 
t t t k 
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where tti is a lower bound of overall profit. 
Maximizing the overall profit is now turned into a lower bound profit maximization problem 
(Equation 3.23). In the short run. this, in general, is only an approximation to the optimal 
solution. However, in the long run when the markets are assumed to be fully competitive, this 
will guarantee the overall profit ma.ximization. 
Maximize tti = Pn.t * Pt -  T.?' Pfs.t * Pf ^ 
APt, 5V-'fc -  Er'(P^6.r + P''h) * -^Pt - Er Pf'sv.k * SV% 
Such a lower bound maximization problem can be categorized into a "MaxMin" strategy, 
which is frequently used in decision making. 
3.3.4 Minimizing the Upper Bound Cost 
As the proposed transactions Pf are known when the ISO manages the congestion and 
selects the necessary services, the objective function of lower bound profit maximization can be 
converted into an upper bound cost minimization problem which is expressed in Equation 3.24. 
Minimize Cost = + /»<<) * AP,] + P^si-k * SV'k ^ ^ ^ 
APc, SVk 
The first term in Equation 3.24 stands for the total congestion cost, where {pr^ ^  — pri t) 'S 
the upper bound cost for transaction t when a single unit of energy is curtailed. The second 
term represents the upper bound of the true service cost. It corresponds to the cash flow (8) 
in Figure 3.1 that is purchased by the ISO from the service providers. 
The objective function in Equation 3.24 can be used to identify services and manage con­
gestion simultaneously. In case that the proposed transactions do not cause any violations, the 
objective function will only include the second term, which minimizes the total cost of services. 
In case the proposed transactions cause the security violation, the congestion cost will not 
serve as the transmission revenue generator as proposed in Reference [24]. It represents the 
upper bound loss of profit for each transaction, which is compatible with the cost of service. In 
this way, the coupling between congestion management and service identification is handled. 
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Although it seems that the energy market participants have the incentive to overbid the cost 
of adjustment, the remaining transaction will have to pay the high cost of services. This may 
encourage the participants to adjust their bids for next submission. 
3.4 General Constraints 
Given the objective function defined in previous section, the solution of the service identi­
fication and congestion management must satisfy the constraints, which represent the require­
ment of the system operation. These constraints are categorized into equalities and inequalities. 
3.4.1 Active Equalities 
The set of equalities always includes the power flow equations for scheduled load and 
generations. 
1. Power flow constraints 
P-|-TP= Re(V.*T) 
_ (3.25) 
Q-t-AQ = ImiV.*T) 
These constraints represent the conservation of power at each bus P and Q stand for the 
real and reactive power injection at the base case. AP and AQ are the incremental real 
and reactive power injection because of the transactions and the services. V and I are 
the vectors of bus voltage and current in the final case. 
2. Power balance constraints 
Hi; Pg — Yld Pd + 
^ (3.26) 
Ylg Qg = Hd Qd + Ql 
These constraints represent the power conservation for the complete network. Pg and Qg 
stand for the real and reactive power output for generator <7, while P^ and Qj are the 
real and reactive power of load d. The real and reactive power loss are represented by 
the P[ and Qi. 
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3.4.2 Inequality Constraints 
Tlie following quantities have upper and/or lower limits that must be satisfied. 
1. Dispatchable sources of transactions and services. 
These sources includes the curtailable transactions (Equation 3.27) and the sources of 
services (Equation 3.28). 
0 < A P t <  P I '  (3.27) 
0 < SVk < (3.28) 
Equation 3.27 indicates that the adjustment of each transaction should not e.Kceed the 
proposed transaction level Pf. Equation 3.28 is a general description of service lim­
its. Since a single-auction model was assumed in this research for service markets, the 
identified services should not e.xceed the proposed service bids {S^). 
2. Variables 
This refers to the constraints on the state variables, such as the voltage, the phase angles, 
the tap positions. Equation 3.29 is a typical voltage constraint for any load or generator 
bus. 
^ ^ ^i.max (3.29) 
3. Functions 
There are also constraints that must be enforced for the reliable operation of the power 
system. These constraints are. in most cases, functions of the state variables, such as the 
line flow, measure of security and etc. A general expression is given in Equation 3.30. 
However, for different functions, it may be more convenient to adopt other forms of this 
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expression. In some cases, such an explicit form of function limits may not even be 
available. 
fm,n < fi V;. S,. •••)< Uax (3.30) 
3.5 Summary 
In this chapter, a general optimization procedure is defined and developed to determine the 
appropriate transaction curtailment while identifying necessary services. Through the analysis 
of the major cash flows, the ideal objective function was defined to ma.Kimize the overall profit, 
where each participant is treated equally in term of profit, so that the non-discriminatory 
transmission open access is guaranteed. Because of limited available information, a lower bound 
profit maximization was identified as a substitute objective function. It changed the power 
system operation into a price-based operation. Therefore, the ISO's decision in congestion 
management and service identification will depend on the cost of congestion and cost of services, 
which are reflected by the buy and sell bids in the energy markets and service markets. 
.\mong various services that are traded in the market, only the reactive support service 
and real power loss service are included in this research. In next chapter, the evaluation of the 
cost and bid prices of the two services are presented. 
52 
4 COST AND PRICE OF REACTIVE SUPPORT AND LOSS SERVICES 
In previous chapter, a general optimization procedure for the ISO to identify service and 
manage congestion was proposed. .Although this procedure is flexible enough to identify all 
the services, the intention of this research is to identify the reactive support and real power 
loss service. This involves the cost and bid price evaluation of these two services, which is the 
individual behavior of market participants. 
In this chapter, the process for evaluating costs and determining bids are analyzed. The 
sources of reactive support and real power loss services are presented in Section 4.1. .After that, 
the analytic framework for economic cost analysis is discussed in Sections 4.2 through 4.5. How 
to prepare the bid for the two services is briefly presented in Section 4.6. 
4.1 Sources of Reactive Support Service and Real Power Losses 
4.1.1 Sources of Reactive Support Service 
The service of reactive supply and voltage support comes from both the generation sources 
and the transmission sources. 
• generation sources 
Generators are important sources of reactive power and voltage support. They can work 
at leading or lagging power factors so that reactive power can be delivered to or absorbed 
from the power system. The generator voltages, which are controlled by the excitors, 
also have important effect on the voltage level of the entire system. 
• transmission sources 
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Transmission sources provide local reactive power and voltage support. These sources 
includes the tapnchanging transformers, capacitor banks, static voltage compensators. 
Synchronous compensators, and various shunt or serial reactive compensation devices. 
Besides that, the shunt of high voltage transmission lines are also sources of reactive 
power. 
Except for the reactive power from transmission lines, all the other sources of reactive 
supply and voltage support can be scheduled and controlled by the operator. 
The reactive power from generators can be traded on the reactive power market, which 
is a market separated from the real power markets and other service markets. For reactive 
support from transmission sources, as the transmission system is assumed to be monopoly, 
there is no market for these sources. However, the operation of these devices will be based on 
the technical and cost factors and are under the supervision of the system operators. 
4.1.2 Sources of Real Power Loss Service 
Different from the service of reactive support, generators are the only producers of the real 
power. .Although other factors, such as the location and amount of reactive support, will affect 
the level of real power losses, the generators are the direct providers of real power loss service. 
In the real power loss market, the suppliers could submit their bids to show their willingness 
to provide e.xtra energy for the transmission losses. 
4.2 Economic Cost Analysis 
The cost of services is reflected in the objective function and it will affect the service iden­
tification results. In Section 2.3.4, several types of cost were identified from various literature 
sources and include such items as embedded cost, marginal cost, operating cost, and reinforce­
ment cost. They correspond to the different aspects of the cost for evaluating transmission 
usage and ancillary services. In this research, the cost of interest refers to the "economic cost"'. 
It represents the true overall cost. 
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According to [76], the economic cost consists of the explicit and implicit costs. E.xplicit 
costs are the costs that must be paid directly. They include the capital costs of the facilities 
and the operating costs of production. Implicit costs mainly refer to opportunity costs, which 
are defined as the value of something in its ne.xt best employment. 
The following e.xample illustrates the meaning of explicit costs and implicit costs. Suppose 
a professor, earning S40.000 per year, decided to quit academia to start a computer software 
business. Two part-time students programmers are each hired at SoOO per month (S6.000 per 
year) and they work in an apartment that the professor rents for SoOO per month (S6.000 
per year). The utility bill runs S.300 per month (S3.600 per year). Table 4.1 summarizes the 
professor's costs. 
Table 4.1 E.xample of explicit cost and implicit cost 
Type of Cost Resource .Amount 
Explicit Costs Hired labor S 12.000 
Rental of apartment $6,000 
L'tilities S3.600 
Implicit Cost Salary in .Academia S40.000 
Economic Cost S61.600 
The total explicit costs are S2i.600. However, to that the implicit opportunity costs must 
be added, which is the income S40.000 that could have been earned in adademia. This cost 
represents the opportunity cost for the professor to run his own business instead of working in 
academia. L'ntil the professor's revenues exceed S61.600 per year, there is no economic profit. 
Opportunity cost is a hot topic today in financial managment. It constitutes an important 
part of the economic cost. In the deregulated environment, since each market participant is 
actually a financial entity, the same concept of economic cost should be applied in evaluating 
the cost of services. Hence, the profit discussed in previous chapter is actually the economic 
profit and it measures the entity's true profitability. 
In this chapter. Section 4.3 discusses the economic costs related to generation sources and 
Section 4.4 discusses the economic costs related to transmission sources. 
55 
4.3 Economic Cost of Generation Sources 
In a deregulated environment, energy in the form of real power is not the only commodity 
that is produced by a generator and is traded in a free market. As analyzed in Section -l.l. 
a generator could not only provide reactive support service, but also real power loss service. 
Other services, such as operating reserve service, are also products of generation. 
The energy in the form of real power and the above services are traded in seperate markets. 
Their cost evaluation is coupled with each other. This coupling directly reflects the coupling 
between the real and reactive power and the capacity limit of a generator. Therefore, we 
categorize these services into real-power related services and reactive-power related services, 
as listed in 4.2. .\ll of these services will be a part of the capacity usage of a generator. 
Table 4.2 Real and reactive power related sevices 
Real power related Reactive power related 
Real power loss service 
Spinning reserve service 
Supplemental reserve service 
Energy imbalance service 
Regulatory and frequency response service 
Reactive supply and voltage control 
Reactive power reserve (future) 
4.3.1 Explicit cost 
The explict costs for services from a generator include: (1) the operating cost which corre­
sponds to fuel and maintenance cost, and (2) the capacity cost that represents the capital cost 
investment for the generation devices. 
4.3.1.1 Operating Cost 
Operating cost includes the fuel cost for a fossil-fired steam unit and the prorated operation 
and maintenance costs. The latter mainly refers to the labor cost for the operating crew. This 
cost should be included as part of the operating cost if it can be expressed directly as a function 
of the unit output. 
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Figure 4.1 Ideal fuel cost curve for a steam unit 
Fuel cost constitutes a major portion of the operating cost for a fossil-fired steam unit. 
This cost is a function of the unit input-output curve and the per unit fuel price. Figure 4.1 
shows the fuel cost curve in an idealized form, neglecting the impact of valve loops. 
Generally, a quadratic cost function or a reduced qubic function (Equation 4.1) is used 
to express the relationship between the fuel cost and the real power output. This fuel cost 
corresponds directly to the cost of electricity and the cost of real power related services, such 
as the real power loss service. 
C/ue/ = ClgP^ + bgP + Cg (4.1) 
Cfuet = agP^ + bgP'^ + CgP + (1 g 
For reactive power related services, there is little or no fuel cost' that is directly related. 
Operating costs thus correspond to the small amount of required maintenance costs. The 
capacity cost, which represents the capital cost of capacity used to produce reactive power Q, 
constitutes the largest part of its explicit cost. 
4.3.1.2 Capacity Cost 
Traditionally, the capacity cost of a generator has been specified in terms of the real power 
P (S/A/H'") operating at nominal power factor. However, the capacity of the generator is used 
'There might e.xist little cost of m£untaining generator's cind e.xcitation equipment. 
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to produce not only the electricity in form of real power P. but also the reactive power Q and 
various other real and reactive power related services. The per unit capital cost. PUC's^ in 
terms of the capacity S. is a more proper term in defining the capital cost of a generator. It 
can be derived from the following equation: 
PUC, = '6/MW *pj (4.2) 
where, pf is the nominal power factor of the generator. 
Economically, the electricity, the real and reactive power related services are joint products 
of a generators capacity. They occupy the capacity for producing (real and reactive power 
production) or to produce (real and reactive power reserve). They are non-separable and must 
satisfy the following e.xpression: 
PUCs *S = PUCp * P + PUC\ * Q (4.3) 
where. Pi Cp and PUCq are the per unit capacity cost of real power and reactive power related 
products respectively. 
However, as the these commodities are traded in separate markets, a reasonable approach 
(although it might be arbitrary) to separating them must be found. The power triangle in 
Figure 4.2 is suggested by [54] to define the cost components in terms of real and reactive 
power: 
PUCp = PUC's * cos{cos~^pf) 
(4.4) 
PUCg = Pi'C's * sin{cos ^pf) 
4.3.2 Opportunity cost 
4.3.2.1 Opportunity cost and generator capability 
The opportunity cost of a generation-related service is the value of the generation capacity 
for the next best alternative usage. generator's loading capability diagram [77], plays an 
important role in calculating the opportunity cost. This capability diagram represents the 
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Figure 4.2 Triangular relationship between P. Q and 5 
restrictions on the operation of a generator, which is limited by the synchronous generator 
armature current limit, the field current limit, and the undere.Kcitation limit. Figure 4-3 shows 
an ideal loading capability diagram. Because of these limits, the production of one generation-
related service may prevent some other alternative capacity usages. The highest value of the 
alternative capacity usage is defined as the opportunity cost. 
Q 
f'ifl/f ninrnt limit 
Qi 
.\nnntHrf\urTrnt limit 
0 
Lnrlfrr^citation limit 
Figure 4.3 Loading capability diagram 
For a better illustration, let's assume the capacity of a generator is used only for producing 
(1) energy in real power, which is traded in the energy market. (2) the real power loss service, 
which is traded in the real power loss market, and (3) the reactive power, which is traded in 
the reactive support service market. Further assume all the three markets are always available. 
According to the definition of opportunity cost, the value of the alternative capacity usage 
for one of the commodities, say, reactive power Q, is the profit of the real power energy 
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or the profit of loss service (TTp"") that can not be achieved by producing Q. The maximum 
profit of the two corresponds to the opportunity cost of Q. which is shown in Equation 4.5. 
OC\(Q} = max(0. irp(P). 7r';"{P)) (4.5) 
similar e.Kpression. shown in Equation 4.6 can be used to describe the opportunity cost 
of real power loss service. 
OC';"{P) = max(0, 7r';HP).-,{Q)) (4.6) 
\ote that the opportunity cost is always non-negative. This is because when the profit for 
producing other commodities is less than zero, there is no incentive to produce them, which 
corresponds to zero alternative capacity usage and zero opportunity cost. 
4.3.2.2 Opportunity cost: an example 
The market conditions and the cost of production determine the value of opportunity cost. 
This is illustrated by the following example. Suppose the generator in Figure 4.3 is going to 
produce AQ = Qi and it is desired to evaluate the related opportunity cost. There is no 
other capacity usage except producing real power for sale in energy and loss market. The 
opportunity cost of AQ depends on the profit of AP = Pmax - Pi in each of the market. Six 
different cases could occur: these are listed in Table 4.3. 
ECp''^. and are the explicit cost, energy market price and the corresponding 
profit if AP is sold in the energy market. EC'p". pr'^" and TTp"" are the explicit cost, loss 
market price and the corresponding profit if AP is sold in the real power loss market. EC\. 
OC'if. pr^. and t t, are the e.xplicit cost, opportunity cost, price and profit for \Q. 
The opportunity cost of AP in both the energy market and the loss market is not considered 
in the above table. This is because when evaluating the opportunity cost for Q, it has already 
assumed the reservation of capacity for Q, which means producing P will not happen and, 
therefore, there is no opportunity cost for P. Equation 4.5 and the following relationship hold 
for all six cases: 
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Table 4.3 Six opportunity cost cases 
(S) Case Case Case Case Case Case 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Energy ECp: 11 11 8 8 8 8 
Market pr-p: 10 10 10 10 10 10 
-I -1 2 2 2 2 
Loss EC'p"": 11 11 8 8 8 8 
.Market pr';": 9 9 9 9 9 9 
^loss . 
• 
-2 -2 I 1 1 1 
Reactive EC\: 3 I 1 1 1 1 
Power OC,: 0 0 2 2 2 2 
Market PW- 2 2 2 3 5 6 
TT,: -1 1 -1 0 2 3 
.A.ttend energy market? .No .No Yes Yes/No .No .\'o 
.\ttend loss market? .\'o .No .\'o .No .\'o .\'o 
.Attend reactive market? No Yes No .No/Yes Yes Yes 
^loss ^ ^ ^loss _ £C^oss (4.7) 
TTq prq Ed q Od q 
The six cases use a constant price for the real power sold in energy market (SlO) and loss 
market ($9). Obviously, for the same amount of real power, the explicit cost is the same for 
both markets, no matter where it will be sold. However, in our example, the price of the loss 
market is one dollar cheaper than that of the energ\- market. This makes the opportunity cost 
of reactive power in loss market is always lower than that in the energy market. In each of 
the six cases, there is no chance that the real power be sold in loss market. Therefore, the 
opportunity cost of Q depends completely on the expected profit of unavailable capacity from 
the energy market. 
Compared with the last four cases, the first two cases have higher explicit cost for P. which 
makes their real power profit in both markets negative and the opportunity cost for Q zero. 
Case 1 has a high explicit cost for Q so that the net profit for Q is negative. .Neither P nor 
Q will be produced in this case. Case 2 has a low e.xplicit cost for Q and its profit for Q is 
positive. Therefore, producing Q instead of P is reasonable. Cases 3 to 6 have the same explicit 
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cost for Q and same net profit for P. However, they involve different prices for Q. In case 3. 
the low price for Q leads to negative profit for Q. Producing Q therefore is not reasonable. 
Case 4 has a zero profit for producing Q. However, as the opportunity cost is considered when 
calculating the profit, it makes no difference in producing P or Q. In case 5. the profit for Q is 
equal to that for P. In case 6. the profit for Q is higher than that for P. Obviously. Q should 
be produced in these two last cases. 
As seen from the above examples, different opportunity costs lead to different production 
patterns for P and Q, It also determines the markets in which the generator owner should 
participate. 
4.3.2.3 Evaluation of opportunity cost 
Evaluation of the opportunity cost depends on the evaluation of the profit of unavailable 
capacity. In the practical world, neither the price of P nor Q will be available before hand. 
The fact that the real/reactive power is bought or sold by matching the bids in the different 
markets leads to an uncertainty for the profit. Strategic bidding, which was proposed in [19], 
provides an efficient approach to achieve the ma.Kimization of expected profit in the markets. 
Since the rational behavior of the market participants was assumed, a seller, who is in the 
energy market or the loss market, should intend to ma.Kimize the following function for each 
block of energy for sale: 
Max ETTp = Prob(bid being accepted) * lower bound profit 
P^s (4.8) 
= [1 - Prob(X < prj] » {pr^ -  Cp) 
where, EiZp is the expected profit in either the energy market or the loss market, pr^ is 
the corresponding sell bid, Cp is the explicit cost for this block of real powder, and Prob is 
the probability of other bids price (X) that is lower than pr,. The first term in Equation 4.8 
represents the probability of success of bid pr, in each market. The second term represents 
the lower bound of profit if the bid is successful. 
Based on this suboptimal bidding strategy, the market participant will select the optimal 
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pr, that could maximize the expected lower bound profit EiTp. This expected profit is the 
profit for this block of energy Therefore, the opportunity cost of Q is the summation of the 
maximum expected profit for all the blocks of P that the generator is not able to produce, 
which is shown in Equation -t.9. 
Opportunity Cost — 
= ETTp dP (-L9) 
when APj —> 0 
So far, only the evaluation of opportunity cost for reactive support has been discussed. 
The same procedure can be used to evaluate the opportunity cost of real power loss service. 
This involves the strategic bidding for the real power sold in the energy and reactive support 
markets. 
4.4 Economic Cost of Transmission Sources 
Transmission facilities provide basic transmission services and other services such as reactive 
support service. These facilities includes transmission lines, transformers, capacitor banks and 
other parallel or serial compensation devices. In this section, only the cost of reactive support 
from transmission sources is discussed. This reactive support is not limited to the reactive 
power provided by the capacitor banks; it also includes the voltage support provided by the 
transformers. However, it does not incorporate reactive support from the transmission lines 
themselves, since this automatically occurs whenever the lines are in service. 
4.4.1 Explicit Costs 
The operating cost for transmission facilities are mainly the maintenance cost, which are 
often small enough to be ignored. The e.xplicit costs from transmission sources mainly refer to 
the capital costs of reactive facilities. 
Some reactive compensators, such as capacitor banks, are switchable facilities. Because of 
the mechanical wear during switching, there are only limited number of switching operations 
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that could be performed during their lifetime. Each switching operation corresponds to a 
specific capital cost expressed in terms of S/switching operation. 
A transformer can also be looked as a "switchable" facility, as only limited number of 
step changes can be achieved during its lifetime. Its capital cost can be e.xpres.sed as S/step 
operation. For each step change that is required, this cost should be considered. 
4.4.2 Opportunity Costs 
For the installed transmission facilities, there is no alternative usage.' They will be either 
in operation, or not. The opportunity cost in this case is negligible. 
4.5 Economic Cost Summary for Reactive Support euid Loss Services 
In Sections 4.3 and 4.4, the economic cost of generation and transmission sources %vas 
analyzed. Table 4.4 summarizes these costs in terms of the two services which are of interest 
in this work: reactive support service and real power loss service. 
Table 4.4 Summary of economic cost for reactive support and loss services 
E.xplicit Cost Implicit Cost 
operating cost capacity cost Opportunity Cost 
Reactive support service 
from generation sources 
(ancillary service) 
little impact included included 
Reactive support service 
from transmission sources little impact included neglibile impact 
Real power loss service 
(interconnected service) 
included included included 
^In the real world, there is a necessity of considering short-term overloads %'ersus the decrease in facility life, 
although they are not included in this research. 
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4.6 Preparing Bids for Reactive Support and Loss Services 
4.6.1 Strategic Bidding in Competitive Markets 
The markets for reactive support service from generation sources and real power loss service 
are assumed to involve incomplete competition. Strategic bidding, which was involved in 
Section 4..J.2.3 for opportunity cost evaluation, is needed by individual participants for bid 
preparation. 
Based on the economic cost of reactive power, a reactive support service provider will 
ma-ximize the following e.Kpected lower bound profit for each block of reactive power he is 
going to sell: 
Max EiTq = Prob(reactive bid being accepted) * lower bound profit 
Prq (4.10) 
= [1 - Prob{.\\ < pr,)] * (pr, - Q) 
where. Eir^ is the e.Kpected economic profit in the reactive service market, pr^ is the corre­
sponding sell bid. C, is the economic cost for this block of reactive power, and Prob is the 
probability of other reactive service bid price (.X-,) that is lower than pr^. 
Based on the economic cost of real power, a real power loss service provider will maximize 
the following expected lower bound profit for each block of real power he is going to sell: 
Max E tti = Prob(loss bid being accepted) slower bound profit 
Pn (4.11) 
= [1 - Prob(Xi < pn)] * {pri -  C/) 
where. Etti is the expected economic profit in the real power loss market, pri is the corre­
sponding sell bid. Ci is the economic cost or this block of loss in real power, and Prob is the 
probability of other loss bid price (A'/) that is lower than pri. 
The optimal bids, pr, and pri, will be submitted by the market participants and stored 
in the service database. The ISO will then identify the services according to the available 
information. 
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4.6.2 Cost Recovery for Reactive Support from Transmission Sources 
For reactive support service from transmission sources, assuming the transmission system 
is still a monopoly, there is no existing market for this service so that there is no need to 
prepare the bids. However, at least full cost recovery is guaranteed. 
4.7 Summciry 
In this chapter, the cost and bid for reactive support service and real power loss service are 
discussed. Given the bid information, the ISO will simultaneously identify these services based 
on the overall profit maximization. The detailed service identification for the two services of 
interest is discussed in Chapter 5. 
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5 IDENTIFYING REACTIVE SUPPORT AND LOSS SERVICES 
In this chapter, the optimization procedure specifically for identifying reactive support and 
loss services is defined in Section 5.1. The solution algorithms are discussed in Section 5.2. 
5.1 Setting up the Optimization Procedure 
In previous chapter, the economic cost for reactive support and real power loss services 
were analyzed. The bid prices, which reflect the economic cost and market conditions, are 
included in the objective function, whose purpose is to ma.\imize the overall lower bound 
profit (minimize the cost of congestion plus cost of services) while determining (I) the optimal 
transaction adjustment. (2) the optimal reactive support service, and (3) the optimal real 
power loss service. 
Considering the specific characteristics of the two services, the general optimization proce­
dure analyzed in chapter 3 can be rewritten as follows: 
Min YltiP^'b t "I" P''s.t) * Cost of congestion 
IZa P^q.g * -^Qg 
+  E x  C ' x  *  A r a p r  
+ T,gPri,g* Kg* -^Pl 
Cost of reactive power bought from reactive market 
Economic cost of Q from transmission sources' 
Economic cost of Q from transmission sources^ 
Cost of loss bought from loss market 
•> 
full cost recover}' for cost of reactive power from capacitors 
full cost recovery for cost of voltage support from transformers 
s.t. p-t-AP=/?e(V. * / ) (1) Real power flow 
(2) Reactive power flow 
(3) Real power balance 
(4) Reactive power balance 
(5) Load voltage constraints 
(6) Thermal overload constraints 
(7) Generator voltage constraint 
(8) Capacitor capacity constraints 
(9) Tap change constraints 
(10) Loss support constraints 
(11) Transaction adjustment constraints 
(12) Proposed reactive service constraints 
J.max 
K, * AP, < AP,^ 
0 < AP« < AP," 
0<AQ,< AQP 
Constraints (1) through (4) are active equalities, which must be satisfied under any circum­
stances. Constraints (5) and (6) are security constraints, which show the requirement of load 
voltage and transmission line capacity. Constraints (7) through (12) are dispatchable source 
constraints. 
The control variables for this optimization process are transaction curtailment amount(APt). 
generator voltage (AVj). capacitor reactive output (AQ^)- amount of tap changing (ATapj.) 
and the loss distribution factor (A'j). 
One objective of this optimization procedure is to determine the transaction adjustment. 
The cost of the curtailment is part of the objective function and the curtailment amount affects 
other state variables of the system. Therefore. AP( should be one of the control variables. 
.\lthough the cost of reactive support from generation sources is evaluated as a function 
of reactive power output (AQg), generators' reactive power are. in most cases, dependent 
variables. The actual levels depend on the system conditions and voltage requirements. The 
voltages of generators (AVj) are, however, independent and controllable. 
Identifying the location and amount of reactive support from transmission sources is another 
objective of the optimization procedure. The cost of capacitors and transformers are part of 
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the overall service cost which needs to be minimized. AQc and \Tapj. are. therefore, the 
control variables. 
The loss distribution factor Kg represents the percentage of each generator in supplying the 
system losses. These factors are selected as control variables instead of the individual amount 
of real output because these generator will act as distributed swing buses. One of the ISO's 
responsibilities would be to select the distributed swing buses from those who participate in 
the real power loss market through the bids they submitted. 
5.2 Solution Algorithms 
5.2.1 Brief Summary of Typical Algorithms 
The proposed optimization procedure is. in a broader sense, an optimal power flow. OPF. 
which was first discussed in 1960s. Economic dispatch is its simplest form. It has evolved to 
represent any procedure that is meant to minimize or maximize a certain objective function 
while satisfying the power system constraints. The OPF is a very broad concept and it includes 
almost everything from power flow to economic dispatch. 
The OPF is a large and very difficult mathematical programming problem. .Almost all 
mathematical programming techniques that can be applied have been attempted. The at­
tributes of these methods are summarized next [11]. 
• Gradient methods [11] 
In gradient methods, a Lagrange function for the OPF is set up. The gradient of this 
function gives the direction of maximum increase in the objective function as the function 
of the adjustments in each of the control variables. However, the gradient methods give 
no indication how far along the gradient direction one should move. Besides that, since 
the direction of the gradient must be changed quite often, gradient methods are slow in 
convergence and difficult to solve in the presence of inequality constraints. 
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• Newton's methods [78] 
Newton's method intends to solve the convergence problem of the gradient method. The 
derivative of the gradient are taken with respect to state and control variables. However, 
the handling of inequality constrains is as difficult as that of gradient approach. The 
usual method is to form a constraint "penalty" function. But when near the limit, the 
penalty is small, so that the optimal solution will tend to allow the variable to float over 
the limit. 
• Linear programming method [79] 
The linear programming method is one of the fully developed methods now in common 
use. It can easily handle the inequality constraints. Nonlinear objective functions and 
constraints are handled by linearization. Other main advantages include the reliability 
of the optimization and the ability to recognize problem infeasibility. 
• Interior point method [80] 
The interior point method did not solve for the optimal solution by following the points 
that were on the constraint boundary, but followed a path through the interior of the 
constraints directly toward the optimal solution on the constraint boundary. In this 
approach, no distinction is made between the state variables and control variables. Slack 
variables are added which turn the inequalities into equalities. logarithmic barrier 
function is added to the objective function so that the nonegativity conditions of slack 
variables are handled. Then .Newton's method or linear programming is used to solve 
the resultant equations. 
Among all the solution algorithms, the linear programming technique is comparatively 
mature and fast. It was used in this research to solve the proposed reactive support service 
and loss service identification problem. 
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5.2.2 Linear Programming 
The flowchart for solving the service identification problem by LP is shown in Figure 5.1. 
It is an iterative procedure since linearization has been used. Comparing with the gradient 
method and Newton's method, linear programming is very adept at handling inequality con­
straints, as long as the problem to be solved is such that it can be linearized without loss of 
accuracy. For the proposed approach, we can linearize the objective function and the non-linear 
constraints. 
no 
Converged ? 
Yes 
adjust 
control variables 
(0) Base case power flow calculation 
(2) Create linearized objective function 
(3) Obtain linearized constraints 
(4) Calculate sensitivity coefficients 
(1) solve AC power flow equations 
(5) Solve the LP problem 
for the new control variables 
Figure .5.1 Problem solving by linear programming 
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For the cost coefficients in the objective functions, the cost of congestion for each transaction 
comes from the bids that are submitted by the energy buyers and energy sellers. Since these 
bids are already matched by the broker when the ISO is identifying service, these costs are 
constants. 
The cost coefficients for the capacitors and transformers are also constants since a fixed 
cost will be involved for each operation of these devices. The cost coefficients for the reactive 
support and real power loss services traded in the markets are generally not constants. Strictly 
speaking, for each unit of commodity to be sold in the market, there is an optimal bidding 
price. However, this nonlinear bid price can be approximated by a piecewise linear function as 
shown in Figure 5.2. 
pnce 
of 
service 
*• Service level 
(a) 
pnce 
of 
service 
Service level 
(b) 
Figure 5.2 Linearize a coefficient of the objective function 
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Altogether twelve constraints must be satisfied for a feasible solution. The first four are 
the equality constraints. The solution of power flow in step (1) of Figure 5.1 guarantees their 
satisfaction. The other eight constraints are inequalities, and all of them are linear. 
Control variables like generator voltages and transaction adjustment amounts are contin­
uous variables. Others, like the switching of capacitors and step changes of transformers are 
discrete variables. The best method to deal with these discrete variables is to use mi.xed in­
teger programming. However, to make the calculation easier, the switching of a capacitor is 
transformed into the change of the reactive output, and the step change of a tap-changing 
transformer is represented by a set of continuous tap ratio changes. 
Linear sensitivities are calculated in step (4). These sensitivities give an indication of the 
change in one system quantity such as real power, reactive power, line flow, bus voltages, etc.. 
when another quantity, especially a control variable, is varied. These linear relationships are 
essential for the application of linear programming. The inverse .Jacobian matri.x, which is 
a by-product of the AC power flow, contains the information related to the sensitivities. .A 
detailed derivation of these sensitivities is provided in .\ppendi.K .\. 
The proposed approach is actually a nonlinear programming problem. Solving it using the 
linear programming approach is not guaranteed to obtain a global optimal solution. However, 
as the base case is assumed feasible and the final case is always available (the worst case is 
final case is exactly the same as the base case), the solution by linear programming is at least 
a local optimal solution. 
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6 SERVICE ALLOCATION BY AVERAGE SENSITIVITY METHOD 
In the previous chapters, an optimization procedure was defined for the ISO to identify the 
necessary services of reactive support and real power losses. Since there are costs related to 
these services, their costs should be allocated fairly to all transmission users. In this chapter, 
a service allocation algorithm based on the average sensitivity method is developed. This 
analysis begins with the discussion of the previous allocation methods in Section 6.1. Then, 
the mathematical derivation and definition of average sensitivity is presented in Section 6.2. 
Section 6.3 provides the practical application of this method in allocating reactive support and 
real power loss services. 
6.1 Limitation of Previous Allocation Methods 
In Chapter 2, several allocation methods were reviewed. They are power flo%v-based meth­
ods. sensitivity-based methods, direct decomposition methods, and various other methods. 
Each of these methods have their advantages and disadvantages, which are discussed in the 
remainder of this section. 
• Power flow-based methods 
Power flow-based approaches generally provide more accurate results than other methods, 
although a variation of accuracy does e.xist between different power flow-based methods. 
The traditional approaches introduced in [5o] and [57] calculate each transaction's contri­
bution serially, so that a different transaction simulation order will affect the allocation 
results. The aggregated allocation method [58] and average power flow method [59] at­
tempt to overcome this problem and are comparatively more accurate, but take a longer 
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time. The time requirement for ail power flow-based approaches are, at least, propor­
tional to the number of transactions. Therefore, these approaches are time consuming 
when a large number of transactions is involved. In addition, the convergence of the 
power flow solution can not be guaranteed under all circumstances. 
• Sensitivity-based methods 
Different from power flow-based approaches, sensitivity-based methods generally only 
require one or two power flow solutions, so that they are quick in providing allocation 
results. However, the traditional sensitivity-based methods proposed so far [.5-5. 60] fail 
to cover the total cost. In addition, since the sensitivities are functions of the operating 
status, the choice of which operating condition to use in between the base case and the 
final case affects the allocation results. 
The spot price sensitivity methods [63, 64] require an optimal power flow. The results 
can not guarantee the full cost recovery and the OPF itself is sometimes difficult to solve. 
Convergence may also be a problem. 
• Direct decomposition methods 
Direct decomposition methods are quick approaches. The allocation only depends on one 
snapshot of a power flow. These methods assumed that all the real and reactive power 
are the direct results of all transactions. There is no base case or final case. 
The MW-mile method [63. 64, 6-5] is one of the direct decomposition methods. Its success 
depends on the method used to decompose the transmission line flow into components 
of each transaction. One approach, the generalized distribution factor, suggested in [66]. 
is less accurate because of the D.C network model, .\nother novel topological approach, 
which was recently proposed [67], traces the the flows from generators to loads. But the 
allocation is solely based on the generation or load instead of the transaction. 
The current decomposition approaches [70. 71] separated the comple.x current injection 
at each bus into the currents of the individual transactions. However, the shunt current 
injection from transmission lines and compensation devices are ignored, which could be 
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significant for high voltage systems. In addition, the evenly allocation of the interaction 
component may lead to inaccuracy since this allocation does not depend on the actual 
transmission usage. 
• other methods 
A fi.Ked tariff was suggested by FERC's .N'OPR [4], where the fixed tariff ranges from '.i% 
for loss compensation to 1.0 mill per kwh for reactive support, load following and reserve 
services. Although the allocation would be based on the transaction's actual usage, the 
given price of 3% for loss and 1.0 mill/kwh for reactive support service would not reflect 
the true cost. 
Game theory-based approaches [73. 75] emerged recently, however experience with them 
under various conditions is still insufficient. 
As discussed in Section 1.3.2.2, a successful allocation algorithm should have the following 
characteristics: 
• .-Vllocation quantity: the allocation quantity must fully recover the cost of services. 
• .\llocation ratio: the allocation ratio should reflect fairness, i.e. allocation should be 
based on the actual usage of the services by the individual transactions. 
• .Application feasibility: the allocation method should be feasible in practical application, 
i.e. there should be no convergence problems and the method should require only limited 
computational time and storage. 
Few previous allocation algorithms satisfy all the three requirements. The average sensitiv­
ity method, which is derived in next section, is a positive approach towards meeting these 
requirements. 
6.2 Theoretical Foundation of Average Sensitivity Metliod 
Service allocation is to divide the cost of services among simultaneous transactions. Mathe­
matically, this is a procedure to "decompose ~ a multivariable function (cost of service or service 
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amount) into a summation of several single variable functions (functions of transactions), as 
shown in Equation 6.1. 
F(.\'t. X,... A-„,) = /i(A-i) + MX2] + ••• + (6.1) 
where. A'j. t = I. •••.«/ represent the nt transactions that utilize the system simultaneously. 
F represents a service, for e.xample. transmission loss service. In this research, the service 
function F is assumed to be a continuous scalar function so that the service amount to be 
allocated is the same in regardless of the transaction simulation order. 
The illustration begins with a two-transaction example. Then same conclusion can be 
easily e.xtended to nt transactions. For easy notation, x and y are selected to represent the 
two transactions in the illustration. 
6.2.1 Definition of Average Sensitivity 
Assume two transactions, x and y. simultaneously affect the system. They not only change 
the power injection level from the base case {xq, yo) to the final case (j"„. i/n). but also change 
the value of service from Fq to 
Traditional sensitivity-based approaches use a linear expression of F as shown in Equa­
tion 6.2. where Ax = — XQ. Ay = yn — Uo and AF = Fn - FQ. 
OF OF AF = —Ax -(- —Ay = F^Ax + FyAy (6.2) 
ax ay 
Equation 6.2 is accurate only when F is a linear function of x and y. 
For high order functions, since the sensitivities ^ and ^ are also functions of x and y. 
only when Ax and Ay are sufficiently small, will this linear approximation provide accurate 
results. 
Considering the variation of the sensitivities, average sensitivities are defined by Equa­
tions 6.3 and 6.4 so that AF can be closely approximated by Equation 6.5. 
' n is a general inde.x representing the number of division between the base case and the final case. 
1 1  
Sy'o-dy 
(6.3) 
(6.4) 
/••Tn r y n  
AF = / ASj :{x)dx + j  ASy{!/)dy (6.5) 
Equation 6.5 is accurate when F is a second order function of x and y. 
6.2.2 Derivation of Average Sensitivity 
The derivation of the three e.xpressions (Equations 6.3 to 6.5), and the conditions under 
which they are valued, are illustrated by Figure 6.1. 
Since what we are interested in is how AF is affected by Ax and Ay, we calculate AF by 
following the path along the a.xes from {xq, yo) to (x„, i/„). Figure 6.1(a) shows a typical path 
in three dimensions and Figure 6.1(b) is a two-dimension illustration. 
Equation 6.6 gives an e.xpression of AF when integrated along a typical path (xq, yo) —*• 
(•To.y.) (•fa.y.) -> (-ra-i/n), V< = 0. • • - . fJ. 
AF = F(x„, (/,) - F(xo, I / , )-t-F(xo.i/,) - F(xo. J/o) + F(x„. j/„) - F(x„,y,) 
There are n -|- 1 similar paths («/,, i = 0, • • •, n) between the base case and the final case. 
So, we have n + I expressions similar to the one shown in Equation 6.6. 
/;; FAy.)dx + jy; Fy{xo)dy + F,(x„)rfy 
/;; FAy,)dx + jy; _ jv. 
(6.6) 
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Figure 6.1 Two transaction illustration 
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= i:: PA!Jn)dx + Ed£l±fd£2ldy 
AF = : 
\F = //; FAm)dx + 5d£0)+ME2)rfy + (JVn F,(r„)-F,(ro) _ J,. f^dful^fMloldy) 
AF = ': 
AF = //; FMdx + EA£^mA£Ady + 5d£:Lh^^ ,/y 
(6.7) 
Summing all the e.xpressions and noting that the last term is canceled by a previous like 
term, we obtain Equation 6.8. 
(n + l)AF = //g''(Fj:(j/„) + H + Fr(i/o))rf.r 
(6.8) 
+ ("+U/j:,"^(^.(-^o) + F,(x„))rfi/ 
Let the distance y„ to y^ be evenly divided into n parts, so that dy = . Therefore. 
^ r- + (" + 
J jtq ^ ~i~ I •' j/o ^ 
When n —>• X and dy -+ 0. Equation 6.9 can be further simplified into Equation 6.10. which 
provides the true value of AF. 
AF = r + r P^yi^o) + FyM 
Jj:O Jyo -'yo ^ 
If the second term in the above equation is of the same form as the first term. Equation 6.10 
becomes: 
fun f" //" Fydx 
which is the e.xactly the same as Equation 6.5. The terms inside the integration are the average 
sensitivities according to the definitions provided in Equations 6..3 and 6.4. 
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6.2.3 Mismatch Analysis 
Approximating the true value of A.F by the average sensitivities includes some error. By-
comparing Equations 6.5 and 6.10. the mismatch of this appro.ximation can be easily identified 
as: 
mismatch = ^ Fydx  -  dy  (6.12) 
The term in the parenthesis is represented by the shaded area in Figure 6.2. where AB is 
the sensitivity curve Fy with respect to x. 
J-CI -I-.. 
Figure 6.2 Illustration of mismatch 
When F is a second order or less function, the sensitivity curve AB is a straight line. 
There is no mismatch so that it can be concluded that average sensitivity method is accurate 
for allocating second-order functions. 
6.2.4 nt-Transaction Allocation by Average Sensitivities 
The same conclusion can be easily e.xtended to nt transaction cases, so that the true value 
of AF can be expressed by: 
nt . 
AF = ^  / .45,rf.V, (6.13) 
t 
where, the average sensitivities .45, are defined in Equation 6.14. 
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. ^  X / • • •/ ^x. dXi • • •dX,.idX,+i • • • dXnt , . 
.43.(A.) = —p jr— ——— — (6.1-1) 
J  J  d X i  •  • - d X i - i d X i ^ i  •  •  •  d X n t  
When F is no more than a second-order function, the allocation quantity of each transaction 
determined by Equation 6.15 can fully recover the true service. The allocation ratio can then 
be determined by Equation 6.16. 
f,=jAS,dX, (6.15) 
Ratioi = (6.16) ji 
The implementation of the average sensitivity method and how to reduce the mismatch is 
e.xplained in ne.Kt section. 
6,3 Practical Implementation of Average Sensitivity Method 
6.3.1 Physical Meaning of Average Sensitivity 
.\s mentioned previously, the traditional sensitivities ^ and ^ are functions of x and i/. 
They could be regarded only as constants if Aj: and Ay were small enough. However, when 
F is a second-order function of x and y. the traditional sensitivities, say. Fy = are linear 
functions with respect to x or y. .A.11 the sensitivities curves are parallel to each other when 
the system moves from the base case to the final case. This is illustrated b\' Figure 6.3. 
The horizontal axis corresponds to the change in transaction y. The vertical axis represents 
Fy. When the system moves from the base case (.4o) to the final case (Si), the sensitivity 
curves form a set of parallel lines. The bottom line A qB q is the sensitivity curve when x = jtq-
and the top line .4ifiiis the sensitivity curve when x = j:„. Points .4o, B q.  B y .  and .4i 
constitute a parallelogram. 
In the definition of .4Sy in Equation 6.4, the numerator is the integration of ^ with respect 
to all X. and the denominator calculates the amount of x that makes Fy change. Therefore, 
the division makes the ASy only a function of y, and the average sensitivity curve lies exactly 
82 
Figure 6.3 Physical meaning of average sensitivity 
in the middle of the parallelogram. In Figure 6.3. this average curve is represented by line AB, 
the area under which represents the services or costs allocated to transaction y. 
6.3.2 Accurate Allocation for 2nd Order Functions 
In Section 6.2. it was shown that average sensitivity method has no mismatch in allocating 
services that are no higher than second-order functions. How to obtain the average sensitivity-
is the key to this method. practical implementation does not require the integration as in 
the definition of average sensitivity. Let's take the previous two transactions as an example. 
.Assume F is a second-order function with respect to .x and y: F — ax^ -f- 'Ibxy -I- cy^. 
Therefore. 
Fr = 'lax 'lby 
(6.17) 
Fy = 'ley -H 'Ibx 
.According to the definitions in Equation 6.3 and 6.4. the expression of ,45x and ASy are 
as follows: 
ASr = lax -I- 6(j/„ -1- yo) (6.18) 
ASy = ley -I- b{xn -I- xo) 
Because .45x and ASy are only functions of x and y, their integration along the individual 
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axes are easily obtained, so that the allocation quantity of transaction x and transaction y 
turn out to be: 
f i  =  ( a  *  { X o  +  X n )  +  b  *  i u o  +  
= j(Fj(base case) + Fj-(final case)) * Ax 
(6.19) 
f,  =  ( b  *  {xo + Xr,) + c* {yo + yr,))Ay 
= j{Fy{base case) -|- Fy(final case)) * Ai/ 
where equals to the area underneath the line AB in Figure 6.3. .V similar e.xpression to 
Equation 6.19 can be obtained for nt simultaneous transactions. 
Practically, using the average sensitivity method to allocate second-order service functions 
involves only two power flow solutions, a base case and a final case. By averaging the sensitiv­
ities in the two cases, the allocation quantity can be easily obtained. 
6.3.3 Mismatch Reduction for Higher Order Functions 
The average sensitivity method is accurate for allocating second-order functions. For higher 
order functions, the mismatch can be: 
1. reduced by using a piecewise second-order function approximation until the mismatch 
tolerance is satisfied, and 
2. allocated by using the allocation ratio determined in Equation 6.16. so that the allocation 
quantity expressed by Equation 6.20 is able to completely cover the service. 
= Ratioi * mismatch -|- fi (6.20) 
For higher order service functions, using one average sensitivity curve may produce a large 
mismatch. However, the higher order functions can be appro.ximated by piecewise second-order 
functions, so that we can have piecewise sensitivities. The piecewise average sensitivity can 
produce less mismatch than that of one average sensitivity, as shown in Figure 6.4. 
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r 
x,^ 
Figure 6.4 Reducing mismatch by piecewise approximation 
In Figure 6.4, two lines, AC and CB,  are used to appro.ximate AB.  This produces less 
shaded  a rea  than  tha t  in  F igure  6 .2 ,  where  on ly  one  l ine  AB i s  used  to  approx imate  AB.  
[f the mismatch of two function approximation is still not satisfied, the original function 
can be further approximated by 4. 8. 16. • • • functions. When this number goes to infinity, it is 
guaranteed to have zero mismatch and the allocation quantity converges to the true value. 
-Moreover, a piecewise appro.ximation provides the basis of comparison. .-Vlthough an infinite 
number of functions is impossible to reach, the more functions used, the smaller the mismatch 
is and the closer the allocation quantities will be to the true value. 
The selection of the discontinuity point will affect of speed of convergence. The best way 
is to find a point where non-linearity occurs. For e.xample. in Figure 6.4, selecting point D. 
instead of point C may produce less mismatch. However, identifying these points would require 
much effort and different services may require different discontinuity points. For the purpose 
of practical implementation, subdividing the section with the largest error is a sufficiently good 
choice. 
6.4 Allocating Reactive Support and Loss Services 
In Chapter I, it was suggested that the allocated cost of services be reported back to the 
market participants so that they could adjust their transactions. However, the allocated costs 
depend on the allocated services. In this section, the allocation of the reactive support service 
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and real power loss service using the average sensitivity method is discussed. Both of them 
can be regarded as second-order functions of transactions under most operating conditions, so 
that the average sensitivity method can be applied. 
6.4.1 Loss Allocation 
Whether or not the average sensitivity can be applied for loss allocation depends on the 
characteristics of transmission losses. Equation 6.21 gives a loss e.Kpression. 
Pi= Y. (y-+Vf)G,j-2V^jCos6,jG,j (6.21) 
where V ]  and V ' j  are the bus voltage magnitudes at the two ends of line i - j .  S i  and S j  are the 
corresponding bus angles. Gij is the line conductance. 
The quadratic characteristic of this loss with respect to generator power was recognized 
early in 19.50s [81], where a B-matri.x loss formula (Equation 6.22) was used to represent the 
system loss. 
Pi = P'^  BP + BIT + Boo (6.22) 
However, the difficulty in obtaining the B-matri.\ prevented the accurate on-line economic 
dispatch and other applications. In 1970's, a simplified and improved method for calculating 
transmission loss formula was proposed in [82], where many of the assumptions used in [81] 
were relaxed and loss coefficients could be easily updated on line to represent actual network 
conditions. Both references showed that under normal operating conditions (Vj and Vj are 
constants and close to 1. and 8ij is very small), the transmission loss is approximately a 
second-order function of the real power inputs. 
In this research, it is assumed that a transaction is described by the real power to be 
transferred. .A. fi.xed power factor was assumed if the buyer is a load. Therefore, the transactions 
can be represented by corresponding real and reactive power injections at the related buses. 
When the power factors of transactions are zero, there is no doubt that previous quadratic 
characteristic still applies to transactions. When the power factors are not zero, the decoupled 
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power flow gives the expression of voltage magnitudes in terms of power factor and real power 
injection. 
Substituting Equation 6.23 into Equation 6.21. the power factors at most will add second-
order terms with respect to real power injections. 
.A.11 in all. the transmission loss is appro.ximately a second-order function of transactions 
under normal operating conditions, under which the average sensitivity method can be used 
to allocate loss service without significant errors. 
6.4.2 Reactive Support Service Allocation 
The reactive service allocation refers to the allocation of reactive support from generation 
sources. Since this support is one of the six ancillary services that are traded in the service 
markets, the ISO will allocate the related cost to the various transmission users. Hence, the 
reactive power output of generation sources will be allocated first into the real power injections. 
Al/ = [B ] AQ = [B ] A'AP (6.23) 
r 
J 
Network 
Q,j 
Figure 6.5 Generator reactive power output 
For the generator in Figure 6.5, its reactive power output can be expressed as: 
Qg — Qgi Qgj (6.24) 
in which Qgi is e.xpressed by Equation 6.25 and a similar expression applies to Qgj. 
87 
Qgi ^ i(j gi SinSgi -f- Vj V,' Bgi COSSgi V' Bgi (6.25) 
= C'l sinSgi - Ci cosSgi + C3 
where C'l = —Vg V'iGg,, Cj = — Vj V] Bgi and C3 = —V^ Bg,. Gg, and Bgi are the conductance 
and susceptance of line g-i respectively. 
I'nder normal operating conditions. Vj and Vg do not change significantly so that C'l. C'y 
a n d  C 3  c a n  b e  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  c o n s t a n t s .  F u r t h e r  b y  a p p l y i n g  t h e  T a y l o r ' s  e . x p a n s i o n  t o  s i n { 8 i j )  
and cos{6ij). Qgi turns out to be: 
Qgi = C'l * {8gi — ~ C2 * (1 —2?" + ) + C:i (6-26) 
= C'l * Sgi -j- C'2 * + C3 — C'2 + error 
SI 
where |error| < C'l * — C'2 * which is very small when Sg, is small, .\pplying the appro.xi-
mate linear relationship of the bus voltage angles with the real power injection (Equation 6.27). 
Qgi turns out to be an appro.ximate second-order function of real power injection as shown in 
Equation 6.28. 
S  =  [ B ' J  P  (6.27) 
Q j '  = Ci * - B\k)Pk + - C'2 (6.28) 
t ^ k 
where B^f. and B\f. are elements in matrix [B ]. 
Similarly, the same expression applies ioQgj. Therefore, the generator output which is the 
summation of Qgi and Qgj can be appro.ximated by a quadratic function of real power. 
When the power factors of the transactions are zero, there is no doubt that previous second-
order characteristic of reactive power still applies to transactions. The average sensitivity 
method can be used to allocate the reactive services from generator sources. When the power 
factors are not zero, higher-order terms may appear in the reactive power e.xpression. If the 
high-order terms are significant, a piecewise average sensitivity method should be used. 
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6.4.3 Service Allocation Flowchart 
The service allocation by the average sensitivity method is summarized in Figure 6.6. One 
thing to note is that when the number of approximation functions are increased, all previous 
power flow cases will become either the base case or the final case for the new functions. 
Therefore, only a few additional power flows need to be performed. 
n = I, # of functions 
No 
Yes 
lismatch < tolerance. 
8. Modify the 
transaction amount 
7. Increase the number of 
approximation functions 
1. Number of approximation functions = 1 
4.0btain allocation quantities 
5. Sum allocation quantities and find the mismatch 
2. Perform "base case" power flow ( if necessary). 
Calculate base case sensitivities 
8. Evaluate allocation ratio and 
Calculate allocation quantities 
3. Perform "final case" power flow ( if necessary) 
Calculate final case sensitivities 
Figure 6.6 Service allocation flowchart 
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6.5 Summary 
In this chapter, the average sensitivity method for service allocation is discussed. This 
method is advantageous over previous methods in that it can give precise allocation results 
for second-order service functions. For higher order functions, a revised piecevvise average 
sensitivity method can also be applied. Practical implementation does not require complicated 
integration as in the definition of average sensitivity, and only a few power flow solution are 
needed. The test results of the average sensitivity method, together with the test results of 
service identification are provided in ne.xt chapter. 
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7 TEST RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, the test results and analysis are provided. Section 7.1 gives a brief overview 
of the test system. Section 7.2 provides the results and analysis for costs and prices of the two 
services. Section 7.3 and 7.4 are results and discussion related to the service identification and 
service allocation. 
7.1 Overview of the Test System 
The test system used in this work is the IEEE standard 30-bus system. Its system config­
uration is shown in Figure 7.1. 
29 
28 
25 
26 24 18 
17 
16 
21 
15 30 
22 14 
23 
12 
T 11 20 13 
10 
Figure 7.1 One-line diagram of 30-bus system 
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There are ten generators in the system. All of them are assumed to be thermal units. 
There are four transformers and two of them (the ones that connect buses 11 — 12 and 12— 13) 
are tap-changing transformers. Five capacitor banks locate at bus 5. 7, 15. 17. and 21. The 
cost data for these generators, transformers, and capacitor banks is listed in .A.ppendi.K B. 
Each generator owner and each load owner are assumed to be independent market par­
ticipants. They determine the bids for each market according to individual generator/load 
conditions and various market conditions. 
.\t the base case (already optimal), the overall generation of the system is 6339.2.\/U'. The 
overall load level is eioO-V/iy and the system loss is 1S9.2-V/H''. which is 2.99% of the total 
generation. 
7.2 Cost and Price for the Two Services 
7.2.1 Economic Cost of Services from a Generation Source 
In this section, the test results of economic cost from a generation source are analyzed. The 
generator located at Bus 2 was selected as an example. The data that is available to calculate 
each component of its economic cost is listed in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 Typical data for the generator at Bus 2 
.\Ia.\imum real power output [Pmax] 
Minimum real power output (Pmin) 
Ma,\imum reactive power output {Qmar) 
.Minimum reactive power output {Qmin) 
350 .MW 
100 MVV 
350 MVar (lagging) 
-100 MVar (leading) 
Installed cost { I V )  
E.xpected life ( y r )  
.Availability factor [ a f ]  
Load factor (//) 
Power factor { p f )  
Minimum fuel marginal cost {MC'min) 
Maximum fuel marginal cost (MC'max) 
800.000 S/M\V 
30 year 
85% 
64% 
0.9 
7.92 $/MVV 
9.68 S/MVV 
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Figure 7.2 shows the simplified capability diagram of this generator. Since the minimum real 
power is lOO.V/VF instead of OA/H", the actual maximum and minimum reactive power output 
are Qmx = i'-ioAMVar and Qmn = —95.8.V/V'ar. which are different from the theoretical 
values {Qmax and Qmin) listed in Table 7.1. 
350 
Qmx 
300 
250 
200 
150 
m 
> Z 
100 
50 
-50 -
Qmn 
Omtn 
-100 50 100 150 300 350 200 
MW 
Figure 7.2 Simplified capability diagram for the generator at Bus 2 
7.2.1.1 Explicit Cost Calculation 
Generally, the ISO determines the system operation schedule on an hourly basis, thee.xplict 
cost, which includes the operating cost and capacity cost, should also be determined on an 
hourly basis. 
Operating Cost 
Since the information for a maintenance cost is unavailable . in this e.xample, the generator's 
operating cost for real power production is composed only of fuel cost. .A. quadratic fuel 
cost function was assumed. Given the minimum marginal and ma.\imum marginal costs, the 
marginal cost function would be; 
MCj^^ i  = Jp' = 0.00704 *P+ 7.216 
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So that, the actual cost function is: 
Cfuel = 0.00352 * + 7.216 * P + constant (~-l) 
where the constant is determined by comparing the actual fuel usage at a constant power 
output for a specified time to the value computed using Equation 7.1. 
This operating cost is only applicable to energy in the form of real power and the real 
power loss service, since the two require fuel for real power production. On the other hand, a 
fuel cost is not included in the cost of reactive support service. 
Capacity Cost 
.As the cost is needed on an hourly basis, the installed capacity cost should be converted 
into the capital cost per operating hour (§/M\V per hour). The following equation shows such 
a conversion, given the available information. 
'6/MW per hour — — Pmax^ _ (7.2) 
Pmax * af * If * Si60 * yr af * If * S7G0 * yr 
For the generator whose data is listed in table 7.1. its capital cost per hour is S-^-SO/.l/Vr. 
When the generator is operating at its nominal power factor, the capacity cost in terms of 
MV.\ is S5.04/.V/V'.4. in terms of real power is S4.53/.V/iy. and in terms of reactive power is 
S2.20/.V/V'ar. Here, the S4.o3/.V/H'' is one component of the capital cost investment that should 
be recovered by the real power. It is different from the results of the traditional calculation 
which is S.5.60/A/H'', where capital cost is only covered by the real power. 
Given the operating and capacity costs of this generator, its e.xplicit costs for real power 
loss and reactive support service are shown in Equations 7.3 and 7.4. 
EC {Pi) — (4.53 * Pi) -t- (0.003-52 * Pf^ + 7.216 * P; + Constant) ("-3) 
EC(Q) = 2.20*1^1 (T.4) 
The first term in Equation 7.3 represents the capital cost while the later term represents 
the operating cost. The reactive support cost, as shown in Equation 7.4 involves only a capital 
cost. 
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7.2.1.2 Opportunity Cost Evaluation 
In this section, the calculation of the opportunity cost of reactive support and real power 
loss service is illustrated. Three incomplete beta distributions were selected' to represent the 
respective market-price distributions. Their shape parameters are listed in Table 7.2^ and the 
associated probability and cumulative density functions are shown in Figure 7.3 and 7.4. 
Table 7.2 Shape parameters of market price distributions 
a J Ma,\imum bid price M 
Energy market o •5 ^•Ih/MW 
Loss market 10 10 %2^/MW 
Reactive market •5 •5 ' i ' . i . ' l /MVar 
energy market 
loss market 
reactive market 
Bid pnc« (S) 
Figure 7.3 Probability density function of price in the three markets 
Given the market-price distribution and the explicit cost of real and reactive power, the 
opportunity cost of reactive power is shown in Figure 7..5. In this figure, the solid line is 
the overall opportunity cost. The dash dotted line (covered by the solid line) represents the 
profit of unavailable real power if the real power is sold in energy market and the dashed line 
'This distribution is recommended in [9], Its expression is defined as B{a,,J) = 
"Practically, the market distributions come from the expectation of individual participants. In this e.xample, 
it Is the owner of this generator. Different individuals may have totally different distributions. 
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corresponds to the profit of unavailable real power if it is sold in the real power loss market. 
For this generator, its marginal cost of real power production is between §12.5 and S14.5. 
This makes its optimal bids in both the energy and loss market greater than Slo. which is 
to the right of the dotted line in Figure 7.4. For the same bid price greater than Slo. the 
probability of winning in the energy market is greater than that in the loss market. This 
results in the higher expected profit in the energy market. As the opportunity cost is the value 
of something in its next best employment, the overall reactive support opportunity cost (solid 
line in Figure 7.5) should be exactly the same as the unavailable profit in the energy market. 
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Figure 7.6 Opportunity cost of real power loss 
In Figure 7.5. the reactive power for both the leading and lagging power factor cases have 
opportunity costs because they both occupy the capacity that could be used to produce real 
power. For the same value of reactive power, the opportunity cost of Q in the leading power 
factor is much higher than that of the Q in lagging power factor. This corresponds to the more 
restricitive operating constraints that a generator suffers while operating at a leading power 
factor. 
Similarly, the opportunity cost of real power loss was calculated and is shown in Figure 7.6. 
The overall opportunity cost of loss is composed of two parts. When the real power production 
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for loss service is less than 194MVV\ the unavailable profit in energy market is higher than 
in the reactive support service market. When the loss to be sold is more than 194A/II\ the 
opposite is true. The opportunity cost of loss will always be the highest value of the two 
markets' unavailable profits. 
7,2.1.3 Ecoaomic Cost of Reactive Support and Loss Services 
Given the explict and opportunity cost of reactive support and real power loss services, their 
total economic costs are shown in Figures 7.7 and 7.8. The economic cost for reactive power is 
the summation of the explict cost in Equation 7.4 and the opportunity cost in Figure 7.5. The 
economic cost for real power loss is the summation of the explict cost in Equation 7.3 (with 
assumed constant = 0) and the opportunity cost in Figure 7.6. 
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Figure 7.7 Economic cost of reactive power 
7.2.2 Economic Cost from Transmission Sources 
7.2.2.1 Explicit cost of a Capacitor 
For the 69 E\V' capacitor bank located at bus o, its installation cost is Sll600/A/V'ar. It 
can be switched 28616 total times (=2 switching operations/day x 365 days/yr x 40 years 
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Figure 7.8 Economic cost of real power loss 
X 0.98 availability factor). So. the depreciation cost is 0.41 S/switching operation/MV'ar 
(=§11600/28616). If the capacity of this capacitor is -50 MVar. then each switching opera­
tion will cost S20.O (=S0.41 X 50). 
7.2.2.2 Transformers 
For the 161/69 KV. -50 MV.A. transformer located between buses 11 and 12. its installation 
cost is Sl.xlO® (= S20000/.\/l'.4 x 50A/V''.4). Its tap can be adjusted 157388 times during its 
lifetime (=11 steps/day x 365 days/yr x 40 years x 0.98 availability factor). Therefore, each 
step change is worth S6.35 depreciation cost. If each step change corresponds to a 5/S9c tap 
ratio change, then, there will be a explicit cost of Sl0.16/l%tap ratio (=§6.35/0.625). 
7.2.3 Preparing Bids for the Two Markets 
The energy or services are generally traded in the markets in terms of blocks. Different 
markets have different minimum block sizes. Since different block sizes will affect the average 
cost for a block of this commodity, which in turn will affect the bid prices: in this e.xample, a 
per unit block size (one A/W or one MVar) was assumed. 
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Given the total economic cost curve, the average economic cost (marginal cost for the 
per unit block size) for each of the two services are shown in Figures 7.9 and 7.10. The 
corresponding optimal bid prices are shown in Figures 7.11 and 7.12. 
Strictly speaking, in Figure 7.9. there does not e.xist a first order derivative when Q = 0. 
However, the marginal economic cost at 0+ and 0— can still be calculated. For the marginal 
economic cost of real power loss, there is a discontinuity point. This corresponds to the 
discontinuity at P = 194A/H'' in the opportunity cost curve. 
For this e.xample. since the highest bid price in reactive support market is S3.2/.V/V'ar. 
the reactive power prices are generally within this level and not high. But there is a range 
where Q > 3-lO.V/V'ar or Q < —oOMVar. where marginal economic cost already e.xceeds the 
ma.Kimum market price. In this range, it is not profitable to participate in the reactive support 
market. The profitable output range of reactive support is bounded by the two straight lines 
shown in Figure 7.11. 
For the real power loss bids, the discontinuity bid price corresponds to the discontinuity 
opportunity cost. In some range (P/ > where the marginal economic loss cost e.\ceeds 
the ma,ximum market price, it is not economically profitable for this generator to participate 
in the loss market. 
Because the analytical expression for the economic costs and their associated marginal costs 
are difficult to obtain, the optimal bid prices are found numerically. This makes the bid price 
curve unsmooth. 
7.3 Service Identification 
The economic cost and bid price analysis provides the market participants the methods to 
evaluate their economic costs and to prepare the bids which could ma.ximize their lower bound 
of economic profit. The ISO will select necessary services from the bids submitted. In this 
section, e.xamples on service identification and congestion management are discussed. 
.Assume three transactions are submitted to the ISO and are going to be in effect simulta­
neously in the near future. Their location and amount are listed in Table 7.3. 
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Table 7.3 List of three transactions for service identification 
Energy seller Energy buyer MW amount MVar amount 
Trans 1 Bus 30 Bus 21 200 30 
Trans2 Bus 2 Bus 7 50 0 
Trans3 Bus 23 Bus 3 150 20 
Assume all generators participate in the reactive support and real power loss service mar­
kets. Their bid prices for each unit of service are obtained through the same procedure de­
scribed in Section 7.2.1. 
Two cases are discussed in the following sections. In the first case (Section 7.3.1), the three 
transactions do not cause any violation of operation constraints. The ISO will only identify 
the necessary reactive support and real power loss services. In the other case (Section 7.3.2). 
the three transactions create some violations. The ISO will manage congestion while simulta­
neously identifying the necessary services for the curtailed transactions. 
7.3.1 Case 1: No Congestion 
Since there is no violation for the proposed transactions, the optimization procedure was set 
up to identify the reactive support and real power loss service with the upper bound service 
cost minimized (lower bound profit maximized). This procedure was solved by the linear 
programming technique. The cost of services with respect to solution iterations is shown in 
Figure 7.13. 
Linear programming leads to a significant cost reduction during the first several iterations. 
Its speed of convergence slows down gradually and it converges after 20 iterations within the 
tolerance of less than S20. The overall behavior is not ideal for a small tolerance value. This is 
because of the linear approximizations in both the objective function and the control variables. 
The resultant service levels and their costs for each market participant before (iteration 0) 
and after the optimization (28th iteration) are listed in Table 7.4. 
When the three transactions are added to the system, the level of loss and/or reactive 
support services may be lower than the base case for individual market participant, such as 
Gen 10. But in general, more services are needed to support the three transactions. 
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Figure 7.13 Service identification solved by LP 
The overall loss service reciuired was 23.51.V/U' before the optimization and 2o.06.\/H' 
afterwards. Although optimization does not lower the amount of losses in this case, it does 
reduce the cost of losses. Since the proposed approach allows the ISO to select appropriate 
amount of services from both tansmission and generation sources, the comparatively cheaper 
generators. Gen 1 and Gen 2. become the major supporters of transmission losses. The opti­
mization also brings a significant reduction of total reactive support services both in quantity 
and cost. 
.Although for the three transactions, the total costs are reduced after the optimization, the 
security constraints are still satisfied with no thermal load or voltage violations (Figure 7.14). 
Two other approaches were also used to identify the reactive support and real power loss 
services. Their objective functions, control variables, the resultant total services and their 
costs are listed in Table 7.5. 
.Approach I is based on the the methodology provided in Reference [23] where a series 
of cost minimizations were provided to identify individual services. It minimized the cost of 
reactive support service and the resultant cost is $2197.8, which is the lowest among the three 
approaches. However, since this approach seperates the loss market from the reactive support 
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Table 7.4 Results of service identification 
Before optimization After optimization 
Loss service Reactive service Total Loss service Reactive service Total 
Gen MVV S MV'ar S is MW § MVar S S 
I 2.2 .53.0 30.5 73.0 126.0 5.7 117.8 165.8 407.7 525.5 
2 10.7 171.0 31.4 2071.0 2242.0 •52.9 879.1 2.7 8.4 887.5 
:i 0.0 0.0 21.7 66.0 66.0 0.0 0.0 2.0 6.0 6.0 
4 0.0 0.0 28.9 1038.0 1038.0 0.0 0.0 11.5 34.8 348.0 
o 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 17.3 53.5 53.5 
6 0.0 0.0 105.6 10442.0 10442.0 0.0 0.0 12.5 1220.1 1220.1 
7 0.0 0.0 13.6 878.0 878.0 0.0 0.0 7.6 290.7 290.7 
8 0.0 0.0 45.1 111.0 111.0 0.0 0.0 -84.9 177.3 177.3 
9 0.0 0.0 11.8 26.0 26.0 0.0 0.0 -9.0 -19.6 -19.6 
10 10.7 4909.0 -9.6 19.0 4928.0 -33.6 -499.4 -55.3 112.7 -386.7 
Sum 23..5 5133.0 278.9 14742.0 19875.0 25.1 497.5 70.3 2291.6 2789.1 
3 
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Figure 7.14 Voltage levels before and after cost minimization 
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Table 7.5 Comparison of service identification among three approaches 
Overall optimization -•Vpproach 1 .Approach II 
Objective function minimize minimize minimize 
total service cost reactive cost loss cost 
Control variables V^. ATap Vj, \Tap Vj, ATap 
AQc. K, ^Qc ^Qc 
Loss Service (M\V) 25.06 28.13 10.00 
Reactive Service (MVar) 70.29 79.96 -37.77 
Cost of loss service (S) 497.5 7266.6 419.3 
Cost of reactive support (S) 2291.5 2197.8 13434 
Cost from trans, sources (S) 83.1 282.3 152.5 
Total service cost (S) 2872.1 4313.4 14006.0 
market, the cost of losses becomes very high. 
.\pproach II is the traditional approach for reactive power dispatch [31. 32], where the cost 
of losses is minimized. The resultant tra.asmission loss is lO.V/lt' and the cost is S419.3, which 
are the lowest among the three methods. But, this lower level of losses is achieved through 
the reactive support, which is quite e.Kpensive compared with two other approaches (some 
generators were working in lead). 
.-Vs seen from Table 7.5. the proposed cost minimization achieves the lowest overall service 
cost, among which, the cost from transmission sources is only a small amount and the cost of 
losses and reactive support are the major components. 
7.3.2 Case 2: Congestion Management and Service Identification 
more restrictive set of thermal limits for transmission lines was assumed in this case, so 
that the proposed transactions cause an overload of two transmission lines. The overloaded 
lines and their flows are listed in Table 7.6. 
Table 7.6 F'lovv in two overload lines 
line flow (MV.A.) thermal limit (MV.\) 
Line 2-3 
Line 21-22 
519.5 
706.7 
500 
620 
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Two optimization approaches were set up to identify services and transaction curtailment. 
The first approach is the proposed cost minimization (profit maximization) approach where 
the overall congestion cost and service cost are minimized. The second approach [24] only 
minimizes congestion cost. The per unit congestion cost for each transaction is S40/.\/H'. 
§20/.V/ir and S30/.V/H'' respectively. The resultant curtailment amount, curtailment cost, 
service costs, total cost and the flow for the original overload lines are listed in Table 7.7. 
Table i.i Comparison of results when there is congestion 
Objective function minimize overall cost minimize congestion cost 
Control variables AP. Vg. ATap 
AQ,. K, 
AP 
Curtailment Transl 
Trans2 
Trans3 
0 
0 
144.0.V/H'' 
90.19A/VF 
0 
145.89A/W' 
Cost congestion 
loss service 
reactive support 
trans, sources 
S4335.8 
-S37.5 
-S282.9 
S83.9 
S7984.5 
S42.3 
S740.1 
0 
total S4099.3 S8766.9 
Line flow line 2-3 
line 21-22 
462.63A/V'.4 
620A/V'.4 
4.50.4.5A/V .4 
620A/V'.4 
Both the two approaches reduced the flows in the overload lines. They fully used the line 
capacity as the flow of one line (line 21-22) has just reached its thermal limit. This reduction of 
line flows was the result of transaction curtailment, as well as reactive support and real power 
loss services. However, the second approach in [2-t] resulted in a larger amount of transaction 
adjustment compared to the proposed approach discussed in this dissertation. Since AP was 
the only control variable, it failed to utilize the reactive support sources, which sometimes 
could have a significant effect on the line flows. 
The curtailment amount and their costs also depend on the comparative cost of congestion 
with respect to the service costs. In the above example, the per unit congestion cost for each 
transaction was selected to be S40/:V/H'", $20/A/VV and S30/A/H'" respectively. These amounts 
are decreased proportionally to Sr2/A/H''. $6/Ml'V and $9/A/W. or increased proportionally 
to SlGG/iV/l't'', S80/MVF and Sr20/Ml'F, to represent the comparative cost of congestion. In 
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extremity, the cost of services is not considered when the minimum curtailment is achieved. 
This corresponds to the case with an extremely expensive cost of congestion. The results of 
service identification and transaction curtailment under different congestion costs are listed in 
Table 7.8. 
Table 7.S Different results for different congestion costs 
in­ in- extremely 
expensive between expensive expensive 
Per unit Transl sr2/.\/ir sao/mw S160/.V/H' DC 
congestion Trans2 S20/.V/ir S80/.V/H'- DC 
cost Trans3 S9/.\/U' S30/-V/H- Sr20/.\/H' DC 
Curtailment Transl omvv 0 OA/IF omvv 
amount Trans2 omvv 0 0 omw 
Trans.3 150mvv 144.5.V/IF 139.08A/H' 125A/H' 
congestion S 1350.0 S4335.8 S16689.0 3C 
Cost loss service -Si 16.0 -S37.5 S32.I S365 
reactive support -S351.3 -8282.9 -S 170.8 S37811 
trans, sources S < 8. ( S83.9 §128.9 S280.9 
total S961.4 S4099.3 S16679.0 DC 
Line flow line 2-3 464.88.V/V'.4 462.63-\/V*.4 465.29A/V'.4 458.43A/V'.4 
line 21-22 620.V/V'.4 620mva 620A/V.4 620A/V*.4 
When the per unit congestion cost is comparatively inexpensive, more transactions are 
curtailed and less reactive support and loss services are required. When the per unit congestion 
cost is comparatively expensive, there is less curtailment and more services are required. 
tendency can be observed that, with the increase of curtailment cost, the system will utilize 
more of its sources of reactive and loss support. If the cost of congestion goes to infinity, the 
cost of reactive support and losses is not the major concern when the ISO makes its decision. 
.All the appropriate service sources were used up and the minimum curtailment amount was 
determined, which is 125.1/11'' for Trans3 in this e.xample. However, the transactions not 
curtailed will have to cover the expensive service costs. 
No matter how inexpensive or expensive the congestion cost is. the proposed cost mini­
mization approach fully utilizes the transmission capacity so that the flow of line 21-22 are 
always kept at its specified limit. 
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7.4 Service Allocation 
In previous section, the test results showed that there are costs involved to provide reactive 
support and real power loss services. These costs should be covered by the simultaneous 
transactions. In this section, the proposed average sensitivity method for service allocation 
was tested and is discussed. The results of the allocated cost are not shown in this section as 
they are purely the per unit cost multiplied by the allocated service amounts. 
In order to test the three properties of the proposed method under both unstressed and 
stressed system conditions, the three transactions listed in Table 7.9 were selected. The total 
transaction amount was increased from 63MVV to I.575MW. In this process, the loads at unin-
volved buses, the proportion between the three transactions, and the power factors for loads 
were kept constant. The 1.575MVV value was the last feasible operating point before voltage 
collapse occured. The transition from an unstressed system to a stressed system is shown by 
the PV curve in Figure 7.15. 
Table 7.9 List of the three transactions for service allocation 
Energy seller Energy buyer MVV amount MV'ar amount 
Trans4 Bus 30 Bus 15 250 40 
Trans5 Bus 2 Bus 22 240 0 
Trans6 Bus 10 Bus 3 140 20 
Tests results were compared using; 
1. the average sensitivity method, with (a) one-function approximation, (b) two-function 
appro.ximation, and (c) four-function approximation. 
2. the traditional sensitivity method [55] using base case sensitivities. 
•3. the "major" and "interaction** component method [70], and 
4. the "aggregated" component method [58]. 
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Figure 7.15 PV curve: from unstressed to stressed system 
7.4.1 Loss Allocation Quantity and Ratio 
[t is known that transmission losses are appro.ximately a second-order function of trans­
actions under unstressed system conditions [82]. For a stressed system, this characteristic no 
longer holds. Figure 7.16 illustrates this characteristic through the loss sensitivities. 
The loss allocation quantity mismatches are shown in Figure 7.17 with total transaction 
amount ranging from 63MW to lol'i-MW. Compared with traditional sensitivity approach, 
the average sensitivity method has far better behavior in the sense of allocation quantity no 
matter whether the system is stressed or unstressed. Compared with the two power flow based 
approaches, the average sensitivity method has a similar small mismatch except for the stressed 
cases. 
When the system is unstressed, losses are appro.ximately a second-order function of trans­
actions. Loss allocation by the average sensitivity method has no mismatch as previously 
illustrated. 
When the system becomes more stressed, loss sensitivity becomes increasingly non-linear. 
•Allocation by running only one base case and one final case (one second-order function ap­
proximation) produces a large mismatch. However, by performing additional one power flow 
(two-function approximation) or additional three power flows (four-function appro.ximation), 
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Figure 7.17 Loss allocation quantity mismatch curves 
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the mismatch is reduced quickly and reaches the same mismatch range as the power flow based 
approaches. 
The comparison of the loss allocation ratio for Trans4 is shown in Figure 7.18. It is observed 
that average sensitivity method provides the same allocation ratio when compared to power 
flow based approaches. Therefore, by using these ratios, the true loss allocation quantity for 
Trans4. obtained according to Equation 6.20. is shown in Figure 7.19. tendency has been 
observed that when the number of approximation functions increases from one to two. to four, 
the allocation quantity approaches a fixed value. This fi.xed value, although it could never be 
achieved, is the basis for comparison. 
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Figure 7.18 Loss allocation ratio 
7.4.2 Reactive Support Allocation Quantity and Ratio 
The characteristic of reactive power sensitivity for the generator at Bus 10 in this system 
is shown in Figure 7.20. The sensitivitity is quite linear when the system is unstressed. When 
the system becomes increasingly stressed, the sensitivitity becomes non-linear. 
For the previous three transactions, the mismatch of reactive allocation quantity, allocation 
ratio, and the true allocation quantities are shown in Figures 7.21, 7.22 and 7.23, respectively. 
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Figure 7.19 Loss allocation quantity 
Since the characteristic of reactive power sensitivity looks similar to the loss sensitivity, 
the behavior of proposed method for reactive suppport service allocation are similar to that of 
loss allocation. It provides as good results as power flow based approaches. 
7.4.3 Application Feasibility-
It is noted that the allocation results at the last feasible operating point (total transaction 
amount 1575MVV') was not included in the previous comparison, .•\lthough we can still obtain 
the results of average sensitivity method, the power flow based approaches fail to reach an 
answer because of the diverge power flow around that point. 
Compared to power flow based methods, the average sensitivity method is advantageous 
in term of computation time. Figure 7.24 shows the number of power flows for each method. 
For the power flow based approach, the number of power flows required is proportional 
to the number of transactions. When a large number of transactions is involved, the allo­
cation takes a long time. For the average sensitivity method, the number of power flows is 
proportional to the number of approximation functions. Under most operating conditions, a 
four-approximation function provides good results. 
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Figure 7.23 Reactive support allocation quantity 
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8 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE WORKS AND CONCLUSIONS 
8.1 Suggestions for Future Work 
The research presented in this dissertation was an attempt at developing a framework 
for the independent system operator to identify and allocate reactive support and real power 
loss services. Related work also includes the cost evaluation and bid preparation for the two 
services. While progress was made in this research, it is recognized that many issues remain 
unsolved, and many problems unsolved in this area. The following areas are suggested for 
further research. 
8.1.1 Economic Cost Analysis and Bid Preparation 
• In this research, the economic cost is analyzed for the reactive support and real power 
loss services. However, there are several other services involved in the market-based 
power system operation. They are spinning reserve service, non-spinning reserve service, 
regulatory and frequency response service, energy imbalance service and several inter­
connected services. .Most of these services are products of generation sources. It would 
be of value to e.Ktend the opportunity cost concept for their economic cost evaluation. 
• The market participants in this research are assumed to be the owner of only one gen­
erator. Their opportunity costs are therefore evaluated based on the capacitj' of a single 
generator. This is a very simple assumption, in order not to distract from the basic con­
cept of opportunity cost. For a power company who has the control over more than one 
generator, its the opportunity cost evaluation should take more factors into consideration, 
such as the factor of unit commitment schedules. 
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• The evaluation of the expected profit affects the opportunity cost. Because of various 
uncertainties, the bidding strategy should be used by individual participant to ma.ximize 
the profit. The strategy adopted in this research comes from the work of [9]. Although 
developing bidding strategy is not major part of this research, it might worth to include 
other strategies into the opportunity cost evaluation. Meanwhile, the inclusion of other 
uncertainties and variants in cost evaluation can also be part of the future work. 
• Since a generator is designed to produce both real and reactive power, the capital cost 
investment of generators should be split into real and reactive power-related terms. In 
this work, the power triangle provides a practical method for the splitting. Further 
investigation can be done to see whether other approaches such as valuation pro.xy of 
synchronous condensers could be applied. 
• Rational behavior of market participants were assumed throughout the research. The 
rational behavior of utility ma.ximization may take other forms than profit ma.ximization. 
In addition, irrational behaviors are also observed occasionally. How to incorporate 
different utility functions and consider irrational behaviors might be good candidates for 
further research. 
8.1.2 Service Identification and Congestion Management 
• In this research, the analysis of service identification is based on the market model as­
sumptions. i.e. energy markets are double-auction models and bilateral contracts, and 
the service markets are single-auction models. Under some deregulation rules, different 
models may be allowed for the energy and service markets. This analysis can be e.Ktended 
to incorporate other models. Some research could be done to investigate the pros and 
cons for different market models in congestion management and service identification. 
• total profit ma.ximization procedure is proposed in this research for congestion man­
agement and service identification. It is equivalent to the cost minimization where the 
total cost of congestion and services are minimized. This approach treats the security 
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(congestion) and economy (cost of services) equally in terms of value. It would be of 
interest to apply weighting factors to the congestion and service costs to evaluate the 
comparative importance of security and economy. 
• In Table 1.4. several factors were listed, that could affect the congestion management and 
the service identification. Of these, only a limited number have been discussed within 
this research. Inclusion of some others of these factors would be a natural e.xtension of 
this work. Examples include the inclusion of voltage stability conditions. 
• Because linear programming is a mature technique and because of its easy implementation 
in the M.A.TL.A.B. it was selected in this research to solve the optimization procedure. .As 
seen in Section 7.3.1. the overall convergence speed of LP is not ideal as the coefficient of 
objective function could be quite non-linear. Other non-linear optimization techniques 
could be tried. possible candidate could be the interior point method solve by .Newton's 
approach. 
8.1.3 Service Allocation 
• The illustrative examples described in Section 7.4.2 are somewhat limited by the nature of 
the test system. The reactive power sensitivity is quite linear when system is unstressed. 
This characteristic may not hold if the system includes any non-linear devices, such as 
static voltage systems. It would be of value to test the properties of average sensitivity 
method in these cases. 
• The e.xistence of the base case is an assumption made in service allocation. possible, 
although unlikely, case is that all the flows in the system are the result of transactions that 
are using the system simultaneously. Extending average sensitivity method for service 
allocation in this case is a possible future work topic. 
• In this research, the allocation of services are limited to the reactive support and real 
power loss services. For other ancillary services and interconnected service, this method 
can only be used if proper sensitivities can be obtained. How to apply the average 
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sensitivity method for those services would be an interesting and challenging area for 
future research. 
8.2 Conclusions 
In this research, a framework has been presented for the ISO to management congestion 
and identify reactive support and real power loss services. The framework includes the market-
based power system operation analysis, individual behavior analysis in costing and bid price 
determination, the ISO's behavior analysis in congestion management and service identifica­
tion. and the analysis of service allocation by the ISO. The following sections present the 
conclusions reached from this research. 
8.2.1 Congestion Management and Service Identification 
The ISO's decision in congestion management and service identification is dependent on the 
model of the market-based power system operation. possible representation of the structure 
for the combined energy markets, service markets, databases, and the ISO was defined in this 
research. It can be used to analyze the behavior of market participants and the ISO. 
The ISO's decisions affect the profit of individual market participants. .\ rational behavior 
of a producer is to maximize the profit. However, in the process of service identification, it is 
impossible to guarantee that every participants' profit is ma.ximized. By analyzing the cash 
flow among the participants, a total profit maximization was proposed as an objective function 
for service identification and congestion management. 
Given the limited information that is available to the ISO, a lower bound profit maxi­
mization is a substitute for the ISO to make the decisions. These decisions are based on the 
energy market bids and service market bids that are submitted to the ISO for evaluation. It 
is equivalent to minimizing the upper bound cost of congestion (losses if energy is curtailed) 
in addition to the upper bound cost of services (the money that the ISO pays to the services 
providers). 
Because of the technical interdependence among the real and reactive powers, an opti­
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mization procedure was set up to identify the two services simultaneously while managing 
congestion. It was concluded that the overall cost minimization results in a smaller transac­
tion curtailment, as compared with the results if the decisions are made separately. 
Service identification and congestion management are two important activities in the ISO's 
day-ahead scheduling function. In general, more transactions require more services. The 
proposed optimization procedure helps in the optimal allocation of scare resources. For energy 
market participants, those who value it most and are willing to pay for the service costs will 
get the least adjustment. 
8.2.2 Economic Cost Analysis and Bid Preparation 
The ISO's decisions, in the short run. only depend on the bids submitted by market par­
ticipants. This research provides a possible method for the service providers to evaluate the 
cost of service and prepare the bids. 
.A.n analytic framework for analyzing the economic cost of the reactive support and real 
power loss services is provided in this research. The concept of economic cost has been widely 
used in economic analysis. It represents the true cost so that the economic profit can be 
evaluated, the results of which will affect the behavior of producers. 
In this research, the economic cost was introduced to evaluate the reactive support and 
real power loss services from generation sources and transmission sources. It is composed of 
the e.xplicit and opportunity costs. Because of the various markets in which a producer can be 
involved, the opportunity cost reflects the intermarket correlations. The opportunity cost for 
each generation-related service was identified to be the ma.ximum profit of the used capacity. 
This could be significant in some situations. 
The concept of economic and opportunity costs was applied in this research to evaluate 
the cost of reactive support and real power loss services. Because of the uncertainty involved 
in the market conditions, strategic bidding was used to estimate the profit in each market. 
The bid preparation is an individual activity. Market participants have the right to bid any 
price that they think is proper. However, the concept of economic cost helps them to prepare 
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the bids for the separate markets, which could otherwise be very complicated. The profit 
maximization of each individual market leads to the total profit ma.Kimization considering all 
markets. 
8.2.3 Service Allocation 
Since there are service costs involved to support transactions, these costs should be allocated 
by the ISO to all transmission users. The cost allocation was based on the service allocation 
and. in this research, an average sensitivity method was proposed to solve this problem. 
Three properties must be satisfied for an allocation algorithm to be considered successful. It 
must guarantee the allocation quantities, allocation ratios and application feasibility. Full cost 
recovery must be realized. The allocation ratios should reflect fairness, i.e. allocations should 
be based on the actual usage of the services by the individual transactions. The allocation 
method should be feasible in practical application, i.e. there should be no convergence problems 
and the method should require only limited computational time and storage. 
The average sensitivity is a significant improvement from the previously used power flow-
based and sensitivity-based approaches. Theoretical evidence indicates that for a second-order 
service function, this method guarantees full cost recovery. For higher-order service functions, 
the allocation quantity mismatch can be reduced and eliminated by piecewise approximations. 
These transaction sensitivities correctly reflect the usage of the services. 
The average sensitivity method was applied to the reactive support and loss allocations. 
Practical implementation does not require complicated mathematical calculations. Under most 
operating conditions, the average reactive support sensitivity and average loss sensitivity re­
quire only a limited number of power flows. Since the allocation is performed after the optimal 
service is identified, the allocation amount will not affect the ISO's decisions. 
8.3 Final Summary 
In conclusion, this research has provided a framework for the ISO to identify and allocate 
ancillary services and other interconnected services. A clear definition of the problems and 
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their background has been presented. .Attempts were made to ma-ximize the total profit of all 
market participants. .A.s a preparation for service identification, an analytic framework was also 
developed in this research, which analyzes the cost of services and prepares the related bids. 
.\n average sensitivity method was proposed to allocate the cost of services to transmission 
users. .Although attempts were only made to identify, evaluate and allocate the services of 
reactive support and real power losses, the research could be extended to other services, which 
are or will be involved in the market-based power system operation. 
From the good results obtained in this work, it is expected that the practical application of 
this research will bring significant benefits to the energy and service market participants in the 
deregulated environment. Since the total profit ma.ximization is designed to be the additional 
objective for the ISO's dcKrision making, it will finally increase the welfare of the end customers. 
This work will also be applicable to future researchers in this area. 
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APPENDIX A LINEAR SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Linear sensitivity coefficients provide an indication of the change in one system quantity as 
another quantity is varied. These linear relationships are essential for the application of linear 
programming. 
For the proposed optimization procedure, the sensitivities that are of interest are the sensi­
tivities of state variables with respect to control variables, and other variables with respect to 
the control variables. The state variables are voltage magnitude Ij and angle J,. The control 
variables include transaction curtailment AP(. generator voltages Vj, swing bus distribution 
factors A',, tap ratios of transformers ATapj., and the reactive outputs of the capacitors Q^.. 
Other variables are line flow 5,j. transmission losses Pi. and reactive power output of genera­
tors Qg. The change of APf and Qc can be transformed into the change in real and reactive 
power injections. P, and Qi. at the involved buses. 
The inverse of the augmented .Jacobian matri.x contains almost all information of the sen­
sitivities. The elements are derived as follows: 
f'.P = - V,VJG,JCOs{6,J) - V,VjB,jSin{S,j)) - + K,Pi) (A.l) 
J 
/'.I = - V^V-jG^jSiniS,,) + V,VjB,jCos{Si/)) - {\:2) 
J 
There are two equations (Equations .A..I and \.2) for each bus. which represent the balance 
of real and reactive powers. The known and unknown variables for all equations associated 
with a distributed swing-bus power-flow calculation are listed in Table .A..1. 
.\'ote, the VS bus is not the swing bus in the traditional sense. It only represents a bus, 
whose angle is selected as the reference and it is not required to be a generator bus. 
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Table A.I List of known and unknown variables 
unknown known 
PQ Bus V-'d, Si 
PV Bus QjA 
VS Bus Q.  
Loss Pi  
Among those variables, there are a total of 2n unknowns. They can be solved simulta­
neously by the 'In e<iuations in Equations .\.l and Equations .^.2. .\lthough the generator 
voltages, swing bus distribution factors, and the tap ratio of transformers are constant within 
a power flow iteration, they can be augmented in the .Jacobian matri.x so that the sensitivities 
related to them can be obtained. The .Jacobian matri.K thus is formed as follows: 
./ = 
/^..p '^ h.p -'/..p '^ /..p S/lp  ^
'^d.t •jQy.i "537" •JPl 'jVg Otap i'JK, 
ft.q If ;jFi OVa Otap OK, 
(A.;i) 
0  0  0  0  0  / 0  
0 0 0 0 0 0 / 
Each individual term in the above matrix can be derived from Equations .A..I and .\.2. It 
is nonsingular except for the case of voltage instability. The inverse matrix has almost all the 
sensitivities that is required in this research, as shown in the following expression: 
12.5 
'3V'rf.. 
'Jft.p ^/t.q OV g Otap •-'A". 
OQ. 
•20^ 
•iJ... 
•20, 
fJtap 
•JQa 
:JK, 
05, 
Oft.p ^ft.q 
OS, 
OVa 
as. 
')tap 
35, 
<Jl\, 
./-' = OPi 
^ft.p 
M-
fl.Q 
(A.4) 
0  0 / 0 0  
0  0  0  / 0  
0 0 0 0 / 
The only sensitivity that is not directly contained in the above matrix is the sensitivity of 
line flow with respect to the control variables. Since the sensitivity of line flow with respect to 
the state variables V, and d", can be derived through the expression of line flow, the sensitivity 
with respect to each control variable can thus be obtained according to the chain rule. 
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APPENDIX B LIST OF RELATED DATA 
The data that was used in Section 7.3 is presented in this section. The data for the 
transformers and capacitor banks are listed in Tables B.l and B.2 respectively. The data of 
generators in this system are listed in Table B.3 and 8.4. 
Table B.l Data for transformers 
Branch 11-12 Branch 12-13 
installation cost 
life time 
average step change per day 
availability factor 
SL\10« Sl.xlO'^ 
40 year 40 year 
11 11 
98% 98% 
Table B.2 Data of capacitors 
Bus 4 Bus 7 Bus 15 Bus 21 Bus 27 
installation cost (S/.\/V'ar) 11600 11600 11600 11600 11600 
capacity (MV'ar) 50 •50 80 r 70 60 
life time (year) 40 40 40 40 40 
average switch per day 2 2 2 2 2 
availability factor 9S% 98% 98% 98% 98%. 
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Table B.3 Data for Generator 1 to o 
Gen 1 Gen 2 Gen 3 Gen 4 Gen 5 
Bus 2 6 10 19 20 
Pmar (MW) 350 800 700 700 600 
P,n,n (MVV) 100 150 200 200 150 
Qmax (MVar) 350 400 o 
o
 o
 
o
 
250 
Q,nm (MVar) -100 -300 -300 -300 -250 
I (§/M\V) 800 K 769 K 797K 797K 769K 
y 30 30 30 30 30 
af 85% 85%, 85% 85% 85% 
If 64% 64% 64% 64% 64% 
pf 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
MCm.n (S/MW) 7.92 7.62 6.90 6.90 7.85 
MC^ar (§/MVV) 9.68 10.04 11.23 11.23 10.65 
Table B.4 Data for Generator 6 to 10 
Gen 6 Gen 7 Gen 8 Gen 9 Gen 10 
Bus 22 23 25 29 30 
Pmar (MW) 700 800 700 900 1300 
Pmm (MVV) 200 150 150 300 400 
Qmar (MVar) 400 350 300 250 900 
Qmin (MVar) -250 -250 -220 -250 -800 
I (S/MW) 797K 769K 769 K 686K 59 IK 
y 30 30 30 30 30 
af 85% 85% 85% 85% 85% 
If 64% 64% 64% 64% 64% 
pf 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 
MCm,n (S/MVV) 6.46 7.90 7.50 7.90 8.10 
MCmas (S/MW) 11.45 12.09 9.64 11.78 12.92 1 
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